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Abstract 
  In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research 
suggesting that the historical origin of a country’s laws is highly correlated with a broad 
range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes.  We 
summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation.  We also address several 
objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter.  Finally, we assess the 
implications of this research for economic reform.    
 
                                                 
∗ We are grateful to Daniel Berkowitz, Olivier Blanchard, Simeon Djankov, Nicola Gennaioli, Roger 
Gordon, Oliver Hart, Elias Papaioannou, Katharina Pistor, students in Ec 2470, four reviewers, and 
especially Louis Kaplow for extremely helpful comments.  
  1I. Introduction 
  About a decade ago, the three of us together with Robert Vishny published a pair 
of articles dealing with legal protection of investors and its consequences (La Porta et al. 
or LLSV, 1997, 1998).   These articles generated a fair amount of follow-up research, and 
a good deal of controversy.  This paper is our attempt to summarize the main findings, 
and more importantly to interpret them in a unified way.    
  LLSV started from a proposition, standard in corporate law (e.g., Clark 1986) and 
emphasized by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), that legal protection of outside investors 
limits the extent of expropriation of such investors by corporate insiders, and thereby 
promotes financial development
1.   From there, LLSV made two contributions.   First, 
they showed that legal rules governing investor protection can be measured and coded for 
many countries using national commercial (primarily corporate and bankruptcy) laws.  
LLSV coded such rules for both the protection of outside shareholders, and the protection 
of outside senior creditors, for 49 countries.   The coding showed that some countries 
offer much stronger legal protection of outside investors’ interests than others.   
Second, LLSV documented empirically that legal rules protecting investors vary 
systematically among legal traditions or origins, with the laws of common law countries 
(originating in English law) being more protective of outside investors than the laws of 
civil law (originating in Roman law) and particularly French civil law countries.  LLSV 
further argued that legal traditions were typically introduced into various countries 
through conquest and colonization, and as such were largely exogenous.  LLSV then used 
                                                 
1 This argument followed naturally from the contractual view of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Grossman and Hart 1988, Hart 1995), which sees the protection of the property rights of the financiers as 
essential to assure the flow of capital to firms.   Financial economists have often argued, in contrast, that 
financial markets are sustained by “market forces” such as competition and reputation (Leland and Pyle 
1977, Fama 1980).  Comparative research emphasized on the role of banks (Allen and Gale 1999). 
  2legal origins of commercial laws as an instrument for legal rules in a two stage procedure, 
where the second stage explained financial development.  The evidence showed that legal 
investor protection is a strong predictor of financial development.    
  Subsequent research showed that the influence of legal origins on laws and 
regulations is not restricted to finance.  In several studies conducted jointly with Simeon 
Djankov and others, we found that such outcomes as government ownership of banks (La 
Porta et al. 2002), the burden of entry regulations (Djankov et al. 2002), regulation of 
labor markets (Botero et al. 2004), incidence of military conscription (Mulligan and 
Shleifer 2005a,b), and government ownership of the media (Djankov et al. 2003c) vary 
across legal families.   In all these spheres, civil law is associated with a heavier hand of 
government ownership and regulation than common law.   Many of these indicators of 
government ownership and regulation are associated with adverse impacts on markets, 
such as greater corruption, larger unofficial economy, and higher unemployment.   
In still other studies, we have found that common law is associated with lower 
formalism of judicial procedures (Djankov et al. 2003b) and greater judicial 
independence (La Porta et al. 2004) than civil law.  These indicators are in turn 
associated with better contract enforcement and greater security of property rights.   
Assuming that this evidence is correct, it raises an enormous challenge of 
interpretation.  What is the meaning of legal origin?  Why is its influence so pervasive?  
How can the superior performance of common law in many areas be reconciled with the 
high costs of litigation, and well-known judicial arbitrariness, in common law countries?   
In this paper, we adopt a broad conception of legal origin as a style of social 
control of economic life (and maybe of other aspects of life as well).  In strong form 
  3(later to be supplemented by a variety of caveats), we argue that common law stands for 
the strategy of social control that seeks to support private market outcomes, whereas civil 
law seeks to replace such outcomes with state-desired allocations.   In words of one legal 
scholar, civil law is “policy implementing”, while common law is “dispute resolving” 
(Damaska 1986).  In words of another, French civil law embraces “socially-conditioned 
private contracting,” in contrast to common law’s support for “unconditioned private 
contracting” (Pistor 2006).  We develop an interpretation of the evidence, which we call 
the Legal Origins Theory, based on these fundamental differences.   
Legal Origin Theory traces the different strategies of common and civil law to 
different ideas about law and its purpose that England and France developed centuries 
ago.  These broad ideas and strategies were incorporated into specific legal rules, but also 
into the organization of the legal system, as well as the human capital and beliefs of its 
participants.  When common and civil law were transplanted into much of the world 
through conquest and colonization, the rules, but also human capital and legal ideologies, 
were transplanted as well.  Despite much local legal evolution, the fundamental strategies 
and assumptions of each legal system survived, and have continued to exert substantial 
influence on economic outcomes.  As the leading comparative legal scholars Zweigert 
and Kotz (1998) note, “the style of a legal system may be marked by an ideology, that is, 
a religious or political conception of how economic or social life should be organized” (p. 
72).   In this paper, we show how these styles of different legal systems have developed, 
survived over the years, and continued to have substantial economic consequences.  In 
our conception, legal origins are central to understanding the varieties of capitalism.  
  4The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we describe the principal legal 
traditions.  In Section 3, we document the strong and pervasive effects of legal origins on 
diverse areas of law and regulation, which in turn influence a variety of economic 
outcomes.   In Section 4, we outline the Legal Origins Theory, and interpret the findings 
from that perspective.  In sections 5-7, we deal with three lines of criticism of our 
research, all organized around the idea that legal origin is a proxy for something else.  
The three alternatives we consider are culture, politics, and history.   Our strong 
conclusion is that, while all these factors influence laws, regulations, and economic 
outcomes, it is almost certainly false that legal origin is merely a proxy for any of them. 
Section 8 briefly considers the implications of our work for economic reform, and 
describes some of the reforms that had taken place.  Many developing countries today 
find themselves heavily over-regulated in crucial spheres of economic life, in part 
because of their legal origin heritage.  Legal Origin Theory, and the associated 
measurement of legal and regulatory institutions, provides some guidance to reforms.  
Section 9 concludes the paper.   
We note that this paper is not a survey, and therefore only introduces particular 
papers in so far as they enter the discussion of the meaning and the consequences of legal 
origins.  The last decade has witnessed an explosion of research on corporate governance 
which uses the investor protection framework.  This research has successfully replaced 
the traditional Berle-Means conception of a public corporation with a much more realistic 
for most of the world model of family-run firms, pyramidal and group structures, and 
tremendous conflicts between outside investors and controlling shareholders.  This 
research, however, is not covered in our paper.   
  5II.  Background on legal origins.    
  In their remarkable 300-page survey of human history, “The Human Web,” 
Robert and William McNeill (2003) show how the transmission of information across 
space shapes human societies.  Information is transmitted through trade, conquest, 
colonization, missionary work, migration, and so on.  The bits of information transmitted 
through these channels include technology, language, religion, sports, but also law and 
legal systems.   Some of these bits of information are transplanted voluntarily, as when 
people adopt technologies they need.  This makes it difficult to study the consequences of 
adoption because we do not know whether to attribute these consequences to what is 
adopted, or to the conditions that invited the adoption.  In other instances, the 
transplantation of information is involuntary, as in the cases of forced religious 
conversion, conquest, or colonization.  These conditions, unfavorable as they are, make it 
easier to identify the consequences of specific information being transplanted. 
  Legal origins or traditions present a key example of such often involuntary 
transmission of different bundles of information across human populations.  Legal 
scholars believe that some national legal systems are sufficiently similar in some critical 
respects to others to permit classification of national legal systems into major families of 
law (David and Brierley 1985, Reynolds and Flores 1989, Glendon et al. 1992, 1994, 
Zweigert and Kotz 1998).   “The following factors seem to us to be those which are 
crucial for the style of a legal system or a legal family: (1) its historical background and 
development, (2) its predominant and characteristic mode of thought in legal matters, (3) 
especially distinctive institutions, (4) the kind of legal sources it acknowledges and the 
way it handles them, and (5) its ideology” (Zweigert and Kotz 1998, p. 68).  
  6All writers identify two main secular legal traditions: common law and civil law, 
and several sub-traditions – French, German, socialist, and Scandinavian – within civil 
law.  Occasionally, countries adopt some laws from one legal tradition and other laws 
from another, and researchers need to keep track of such hybrids, but generally a 
particular tradition dominates in each country. 
  The key feature of legal traditions is that they have been transplanted, typically 
though not always through conquest or colonization, from relatively few mother countries 
to most of the rest of the world (Watson 1974).   Such transplantation covers specific 
laws and codes, the more general styles or ideologies of the legal system, but also 
individuals with mother-country training, human capital, and legal outlook.   
Of course, following the transplantation of some basic legal infrastructure, such as 
the legal codes, legal principles and ideologies, and elements of the organization of the 
judiciary, the national laws of various countries changed, evolved, and adapted to local 
circumstances.   Cultural, political, and economic conditions of every society came to be 
reflected in their national laws, so that legal and regulatory systems of no two countries 
are literally identical.  This adaptation and individualization, however, was incomplete.  
Enough of the basic transplanted elements have remained and persisted (David 1985) to 
allow the classification into legal traditions.  As a consequence, legal transplantation 
represents the kind of involuntary information transmission that the McNeills have 
emphasized, which enables us to study the consequences of legal origins. 
Before discussing the legal traditions of market economies, we briefly comment 
on socialist law.  The socialist legal tradition originates in the Soviet Union, and was 
spread by the Soviet armies first to the former Soviet republics and later to Eastern 
  7Europe
2.  It was also imitated by some socialist states, such as Mongolia and China.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe reverted to their pre-Russian-revolution or pre-World War II legal systems, which 
were French or German civil law.  In our work based on data from the 1990’s, we have 
often classified transition economies as having the socialist legal system.  However, 
today, academics and officials from these countries object to such classification, so, in the 
present paper, we classify them according to the key influence on their new commercial 
laws.  A couple of countries, such as Cuba, still maintain the socialist legal system, and 
await liberation and re-classification.  These countries typically lack other data, so no 
socialist legal origin countries appear in the analysis in the present paper.   
  Figure I shows the distribution of legal origins of commercial laws throughout the 
world.  The common-law legal tradition includes the law of England and its former 
colonies.  The common law is formed by appellate judges who establish precedents by 
solving specific legal disputes.  Dispute resolution tends to be adversarial rather than 
inquisitorial.  Judicial independence from both the executive and legislature are central.  
“English common law developed because landed aristocrats and merchants wanted a 
system of law that would provide strong protections for property and contract rights, and 
limit the crown’s ability to interfere in markets” (Mahoney 2001, p. 504).   Common law 
has spread to the British colonies, including the United States, Canada, Australia, India, 
South Africa, and many other countries.  Of the maximal sample of 150 countries used in 
our studies, there are 42 common law countries.   
                                                 
2 The socialist legal tradition illustrates the significance of ideologies for legal styles.   “…the socialist 
concept of law can be directly traced to the movement of legal positivism.  The movement … sees law as 
an expression of the will of the legislators , supreme interpreters of justice” (David and Brierley 1985, p.69)  
  8  The civil law tradition is the oldest, the most influential, and the most widely 
distributed around the world, especially after so many transition economies returned to it.  
It originates in Roman law, uses statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of 
ordering legal material, and relies heavily on legal scholars to ascertain and formulate 
rules (Merryman 1969).   Dispute resolution tends to be inquisitorial rather than 
adversarial.  Roman law was rediscovered in the Middle Ages in Italy, adopted by the 
Catholic Church for its purposes, and from there formed the basis of secular laws in many 
European countries.   
Although the origins of civil law are ancient, the French civil law tradition is 
usually identified with the French Revolution and Napoleon’s codes, which were written 
in the early 19
th century.  In contrast to common law, “French civil law developed as it 
did because the revolutionary generation, and Napoleon after it, wished to use state 
power to alter property rights and attempted to insure that judges did not interfere.  Thus, 
quite apart from the substance of legal rules, there is a sharp difference between the 
ideologies underlying common and civil law, with the latter notably more comfortable 
with the centralized and activist government” (Mahoney 2001, p. 505).  
Napoleon’s armies introduced his codes into Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and 
parts of Germany.  In the colonial era, France extended her legal influence to the Near 
East and Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, Indochina, Oceania, and French Caribbean 
Islands.   Napoleonic influence was also significant in Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and 
some Swiss cantons.  When the Spanish and Portuguese empires in Latin America 
dissolved in the 19
th century, it was mainly the French civil law that the lawmakers of the 
new nations looked to for inspiration.  In the 19
th century, the French civil code was also 
  9adopted, with many modifications, by the Russian Empire, and through Russia to the 
neighboring regions it influenced and occupied.  These countries adopted the socialist 
law after the Russian Revolution, but typically reverted to the French civil law after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. There are 84 French legal origin countries in the sample.  
  The German legal tradition also has its basis in Roman law, but the German 
Commercial Code was written in 1897, after Bismarck’s unification of Germany.  It 
shares many procedural characteristics with the French system, but accommodates 
greater judicial law-making.  The German legal tradition influenced Austria, the former 
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan, Korea, and a 
few countries of the former Soviet Union.  Taiwan’s laws came from China, which relied 
heavily on German laws during modernization.  There are 19 German legal origin 
countries in the sample.     
  The Scandinavian family is usually viewed as part of the civil law tradition, 
although its law is less derivative of Roman law than the French and German families 
(Zweigert and Kotz 1998).  Most writers describe the Scandinavian laws as distinct from 
others, and we have kept them as a separate family (with 5 members) in our research.  
  Before turning to the presentation of results, five points about this classification 
are in order.   First, although the majority of legal transplantation is the product of 
conquest and colonization, there are important exceptions.  Japan adopted the German 
legal system voluntarily.  Latin American former Spanish and Portuguese colonies ended 
up with codifications heavily influenced by the French legal tradition after gaining 
independence.  Beyond the fact that Napoleon had invaded the Iberian Peninsula, the 
reasons were partly the new military leaders’ admiration for Bonaparte, partly language, 
  10and partly Napoleonic influence on the Spanish and Portuguese codes.   In this instance, 
the exogeneity assumption from the viewpoint of studying economic outcomes is still 
appropriate.  The 19
th century influence of the French civil law in Russia and Turkey was 
largely voluntary, as both countries sought to modernize.  But the French and German 
civil law traditions in the rest of the countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and 
Central Asia are the result of the conquests by the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, 
and German empires.  The return by these countries to their pre-Soviet legal traditions 
during the transition from socialism is voluntary, but shaped largely by history.   
Second, because Scandinavian countries did not have any colonies, and 
Germany’s colonial influence was short-lived and abruptly erased by World War I, there 
are relatively few countries in these two traditions.  As a consequence, while we 
occasionally speak of the comparison between common and civil law, most of the 
discussion compares common law to the French civil law.  This is largely because each 
tradition includes a large number of countries, but also because they represent the two 
most distinct approaches to law and regulation.  
  Third, although we often speak of common law and French civil law in terms of 
pure types, in reality there has been a great deal of mutual influence and in some areas 
convergence.  There is a good deal of legislation in common law countries, and a good 
deal of judicial interpretation in civil law countries.  But the fact that the actual laws of 
real countries are not pure types does not mean that there are no systematic differences.  
  Fourth, some have noted the growing importance of legislation in common law 
countries as proof that judicial law making no longer matters.  This is incorrect, for a 
number of reasons.  Statutes in common law countries often follow and reflect judicial 
  11rulings, so jurisprudence remains the basis of statutory law.  Even when legislation in 
common law countries runs ahead of judicial law making, it often must coexist with, and 
therefore reflects, pre-existing common law rules.  Indeed, statutes in common law 
countries are often highly imprecise, with an expectation that courts will spell out the 
rules as they begin to be applied.  Finally, and most crucially, because legal origins shape 
fundamental approaches to social control of business, even legislation in common law 
countries expresses the common law way of doing things.  For all these reasons, the 
universal growth of legislation in no way implies the irrelevance of legal origins.    
  Fifth, with the re-classification of transition economies from socialist into the 
French and German civil law families, one might worry that the differences among legal 
origins described below are driven by the transition economies.  They are not.  None of 
our substantive results change if we exclude the transition economies.  
  With these points in mind, we can turn to the evidence.  
 
III. Basic Facts.   
The Evidence in Brief 
  Figure II organizes some of our own and related research on the economic 
consequences of legal origins.   It shows the links from legal origins to particular legal 
rules, and then to economic outcomes.  Figure II immediately suggests several concerns 
for empirical work.  First, in our framework, legal origins influence many spheres of law-
making and regulation, which makes it dangerous to use them as instruments.  Second, 
we have drawn a rather clean picture pointing from particular legal rules to outcomes.  In 
reality, a variety of legal rules (e.g., those governing both investor protection and legal 
  12procedure) can influence the protection of outside investors and hence financial markets.  
This, again, makes empirical work less clean. 
  Before turning to the evidence, we make four comments about the data.  First, all 
the data used in this paper, and a good deal more, are available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data.html.   We do not discuss the 
data in detail, but the descriptions are available in the original papers presenting the data.   
Second, the basic evidence we present takes the form of cross-country studies.  
An important feature of these studies is that all countries receive the same weight.  There 
is no special treatment of mother countries, of rich countries, etc.  This design may 
obscure the differences, discussed below, within legal origins, such as the greater 
dynamism of law in mother countries than in former colonies.   
Third, the sources of data on legal rules and institutions vary significantly across 
studies.  Some rules, such as many indicators of investor protection and of various 
government regulations, come from national laws.  Those tend to be “laws on the books.”  
Other indicators are mixtures of national laws and actual experiences, and tend to 
combine substantive and procedural rules.   These variables are often constructed through 
collaborative efforts with law firms around the world, and yield summary indicators of 
legal rules and their enforcement.  For example, the study of legal formalism (Djankov et 
al. 2003b) reflects the lawyers’ characterization of procedural rules that would typically 
apply to a specific legal dispute; the study of the efficiency of debt enforcement (Djankov 
et al. 2006) incorporates estimates of time, cost, and resolution of a standardized 
insolvency case.  The data used in each study have their advantages and problems.  An 
  13important fact, however, is the consistency of results across both data collection 
procedures and spheres of activity that we document below.     
Fourth, over the years, various writers have criticized both the conceptual 
foundations of LLSV variables such as shareholder rights indices (Coffee 1999) and the 
particular values we have assigned to these variables, in part because of conceptual 
ambiguity (Spamann 2005).  We have corrected our mistakes, but have also moved on to 
conceptually less ambiguous measures (Djankov et al. 2008).   These corrections have 
strengthened the original results.  The findings we discuss below use the most recent data.   
To organize the discussion, we do not provide a full survey of the available 
evidence, but rather a sampling with an emphasis on the breadth of the findings.  The 
available studies have followed a similar pattern, shown in Figure II.  They first consider 
the effect of legal origins on particular laws and regulations, and then the effects of these 
laws and regulations on the economic outcomes that they might influence most directly.    
The available studies can be divided into three categories.  First, several studies 
following LLSV (1997, 1998) examine the effects of legal origins on investor protection, 
and then the effect of investor protection on financial development.  Some of these 
studies look at stock markets.    The LLSV measure of anti-director rights has been 
replaced by a measure of shareholder protection through securities laws in the offerings 
of new issues (La Porta et al. 2006), and by another measure of shareholder protection 
from self-dealing by corporate insiders through corporate law (Djankov et al. 2008).   As 
outcomes, these studies use such measures as the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GDP, the pace of public offering activity, the voting premium (see Dyck and Zingales 
2004), dividend payouts (La Porta et al. 2000), Tobin’s Q (La Porta et al. 2002), and 
  14ownership dispersion (La Porta et al. 1999).   Predictions for each of these variables 
emerge from a standard agency model of corporate governance, in which investor 
protection shapes external finance (e.g., Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002)
 3.  
Other studies in this category look at creditor rights.  The LLSV (1997, 1998) 
measure from bankruptcy laws has been updated by Djankov et al. (2007).   Djankov et 
al. (2006) take a different approach to creditor protection by looking at the actual 
efficiency of debt enforcement, as measured by creditor recovery rates in a hypothetical 
case of an insolvent firm.  The latter study addresses a common criticism that it is law 
enforcement, rather than rules on the books, that matters for investor protection by 
integrating legal rules and characteristics of enforcement in the efficiency measure.  La 
Porta et al. (2002) focus on state involvement in financial markets by looking at 
government ownership of banks.    These studies typically consider the size of debt 
markets as an outcome measure, although Djankov et al. (2007) also examine several 
subjective assessments of the quality of private debt markets.   
In the second category, several papers consider government regulation, or even 
ownership, of particular economic activities.   Djankov et al. (2002) look at the number of 
steps an entrepreneur must complete in order to begin operating a business legally, a 
number that in 1999 ranged from 2 in Australia and Canada to 21 in the Dominican 
Republic.  They examine the impact of such entry regulation on corruption and the size of 
the unofficial economy.   Botero et al. (2004) construct indices of labor market regulation 
and examine their effect on labor force participation rates and unemployment.  Djankov 
et al. (2003a) examine government ownership of the media, which remains extensive 
                                                 
3 The theoretical prediction that investor protection leads to greater ownership dispersion is not 
unambiguous, and the data on ownership around the world is less clean and satisfactory than that on other 
variables.  Nonetheless, much of the criticism of LLSV has focused on ownership dispersion.   
  15around the world, particularly for television.  Mulligan and Shleifer (2005a,b) look at one 
of the ultimate forms of government intervention in private life, military conscription.      
The third category of papers investigates the effects of legal origins on the 
characteristics of the judiciary (and other government institutions), and then the effect of 
those on the security of property rights and contract enforcement.   Djankov et al. (2003b) 
look at the formalism of judicial procedures in various countries, and its effect on the 
time it takes to evict a non-paying tenant or to collect a bounced check.  This variable can 
be interpreted more broadly as the efficiency of contract enforcement by courts, and in 
fact turns out to be highly correlated with the efficiency of debt collection obtained in an 
entirely different way by Djankov et al. (2006).  La Porta et al. (2004) adopt a very 
different strategy and collect information from national constitutions on judicial 
independence (as measured by judicial tenure) and the acceptance of appellate court 
rulings as a source of law.  They then ask directly whether judicial independence 
contributes to the quality of contract enforcement and the security of property rights.    
Tables I-III show a sampling of results from each category of studies.  In each 
Table, the top panel presents the regressions of legal or regulatory institutions on legal 
origins, controlling only for per capita income.  In the original papers, many more 
controls and robustness checks are included, but here we present the stripped down 
regressions.  The bottom panel of each Table then presents some results of regressions of 
outcomes on legal rules.  We could of course combine the two panels in an instrumental 
variables specification, but, as we indicated previously, we do not recommend such 
specifications since legal origins influence a broad range of rules and regulations, and we 
cannot guarantee that the relevant ones are not omitted in the first stage.  
  16Begin with Table I.  Higher income per capita is associated with better 
shareholder and creditor protection, more efficient debt collection, and lower government 
ownership of banks (Panel A).  Civil law is generally associated with lower shareholder 
and creditor protection, less efficient debt enforcement, and higher government 
ownership of banks.  The estimated coefficients imply that, compared to common law, 
French legal origin is associated with a reduction of 0.33 in the anti-self-dealing index 
(which ranges between 0 and 1), of 0.33 in the index of prospectus disclosure (which 
ranges between 0 and 1), of 0.84 in the creditor rights index (which ranges from 0 to 4), 
of 13.6 points  in the efficiency of debt collection (out of 100), and a rise of 33 
percentage points in government ownership of banks.  The effect of legal origins on legal 
rules and financial institutions is statistically significant and economically large. 
Higher income per capita is generally associated with more developed financial 
markets, as reflected in a higher stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio, more firms per 
capita, less ownership concentration, a lower control premium, a higher private-credit-to-
GDP ratio, and lower interest rate spreads.
4  Investor protection is associated with more 
developed financial markets (Panel B).  The estimated coefficients imply that a two-
standard deviation increase in the anti-self-dealing index is associated with an increase in 
the stock-market-to-GDP ratio of 42 percentage points, an increase in listed firms per 
capita of 38 percentage points, and a reduction in ownership concentration of 6 
percentage points.  A two-standard deviation improvement in prospectus disclosure is 
associated with a reduction in the control premium of 0.15 (the mean premium is 0.11). 
                                                 
4 Recent research has looked at additional outcome variables as well as measures of credit market 
regulation. Esty and Megginson (2003) find that creditor protection shapes foreign bank lending, while 
Ongena and Smith (2000) show it influences the number of banking relationships.   Qian and Strahan 
(2007) find that better creditor protection lowers interest rates that lenders charge.   Barth et al. (2004) 
introduce measures of banking regulation and show that they vary systematically by legal origin. 
  17The effect of legal rules on debt markets is also large.  A two-standard deviation increase 
in creditor rights is associated with an increase of 15 percentage points in the private-
credit-to-GDP ratio.  A two-standard deviation increase in the efficiency of debt 
collection is associated with an increase of 27 percentage points in the private-credit-to-
GDP ratio.  A two-standard deviation increase in government ownership of banks is 
associated with a 16 percentage point rise in the spread between lending and borrowing 
rates (the median spread is 12).
5  
Table II presents the results on regulation.  Higher income per capita is correlated 
with lower entry regulation and government ownership of the media, but not with labor 
regulation or conscription (Panel A).  Both French and German civil origins have more 
entry and labor regulation, higher state ownership of the media, and heavier reliance on 
conscription
6.  The coefficients imply that, compared to common law, French legal origin 
is associated with an increase of 0.69 in the (log) number of steps to open a new business 
(which ranges from 0.69 to 3.0), a rise of 0.26 in the index of labor regulation (which 
ranges from 0.15 to 0.83), a 0.21 rise in government ownership of the media (which 
ranges from 0 to 1), and a 0.55 increase in conscription (which ranges from 0 to 1).   
According to the estimated coefficients in Panel B, a two-standard deviation 
increase in the (log) number of steps to open a new business is associated with a 0.71 
worsening of the corruption index and a 14 percentage point rise in employment in the 
unofficial economy.  A two-standard deviation increase in the regulation of labor implies 
                                                 
5 Sapienza (2004) shows that government-owned banks in Italy lend to big enterprises rather than small 
ones.  Dinc (2005) finds that government-owned banks sharply increase lending in election years.  Khwaja 
and Mian (2005) present evidence that politically-connected firms in Pakistan get preferential treatment 
from government-owned banks.  They borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates.  
 
6 In a similar spirit, Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2007) show that constitutional commitments to “social rights” 
(the right to social security, education, health, housing, and workers rights) are less prevalent in common 
law countries than in the French civil law ones. 
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percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, and a 5.67 percentage point rise in 
the unemployment rate of young males.   
 Table III shows the results on judicial institutions.  Higher income per capita is 
associated with less legal formalism but not with longer judicial tenure or the acceptance 
of case law (Panel A).  Here again, legal origin has a pronounced effect on institutions.  
Compared to common law countries, civil law countries generally have more legal 
formalism, lower judicial tenure, and sharply lower constitutional acceptance of case 
law
7.  The estimated coefficients imply that French legal origin is associated with an 
increase of 1.49 in the index of legal formalism, a reduction of 0.24 in judicial tenure, and 
of 0.67 in case law.  These are large effects since legal formalism ranges from 0.73 to 6.0, 
and both judicial tenure and case law range from 0 to 1.  
Judicial institutions matter for both the efficiency of contract enforcement and the 
security of property rights (Panel B).  The estimated coefficients imply that a two-
standard deviation increase in legal formalism is associated with a 65 percentage point 
increase in the time to collect on a check and a reduction of 1.1 in the index of contract 
enforcement (the latter ranges from 3.5 to 8.9).  Moreover, a two-standard deviation 
increase in judicial tenure is associated with a 2.9 point rise in the property rights index.  
Finally, a two standard deviation increase in case law is associated with an improvement 
of 1.3 points in the property rights index, which ranges from 1 to 5.  
                                                 
7 Berkowitz and Clay (2005, 2006, 2007) exploit the fact that ten US states were 
initially settled by France, Spain, or Mexico to examine the effects of legal origin.  They 
find that states initially settled by civil law countries granted less independence to their 
judiciaries as recently as 1970-90, had lower quality courts in 2001-03, and used different 
procedures for setting judicial budgets as late as 1960-2000.   
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  So, what do we learn from these tables?   The economic consequences of legal 
origins are pervasive.   Compared to French civil law, common law is associated with a) 
better investor protection, which in turn is associated with improved financial 
development, better access to finance, and higher ownership dispersion, b) lighter 
government ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated with less corruption, 
better functioning labor markets, and smaller unofficial economies, and c) less formalized 
and more independent judicial systems, which are in turn associated with more secure 
property rights and better contract enforcement.   
  The most important aspect of these results from our viewpoint is how pervasive is 
the influence of legal origins.  As we discuss below, many objections have been raised 
with respect to individual pieces of this evidence.  We address later the most far-reaching 
criticism, that legal origin is a proxy for something else, but deal here with more 
parochial concerns.  The key point to start with, however, is that objections rarely come 
to grips with the breadth of the influence of legal origins on economic outcomes.  
  We focus on objections to the law and finance evidence.  The most immediate 
objection is reverse causality: countries improve their laws protecting investors as their 
financial markets develop, perhaps under political pressure from those investors.  If 
instrumental variable techniques were appropriate in this context, a two stage procedure, 
in which in the first stage the rules are instrumented by legal origins, would address this 
objection.  LLSV (1997, 1998) pursue this strategy.  But even if instrumental variable 
techniques are inappropriate because legal origin influences finance through channels 
other than rules protecting investors, legal origins are still exogenous, and to the extent 
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market development.   Moreover, this criticism in no way rejects the significance of legal 
origins in shaping outcomes; it speaks only to the difficulty of identifying the channel.  
  Recent evidence has gone beyond cross-section to look at changes in financial 
development in response to changes in legal rules, thereby relieving the reverse causality 
concerns.  Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2006) examine the effects of the 
1964 Securities Act Amendments, which increased the disclosure requirements for US 
over-the-counter firms.  They find that firms subject to the new disclosure requirements 
had a statistically significant abnormal excess return of about 10% over the year and a 
half that the law was debated and passed relative to a comparison group of unaffected 
NYSE/AMEX firms.  Bushee and Leuz (2005) obtain similar findings using a regulatory 
change on US over-the-counter markets.  Linciano (2003) examines the impact of the 
Draghi reforms in Italy, which improved shareholder protection.  The voting premium 
steadily declined over the period that the Draghi committee was in operation, culminating 
in a drop of 7 percent in the premium at the time of the passage of the law.  Nenova 
(2006) analyzes how the control premium is affected by changes in shareholder 
protection in Brazil.  She documents that the control value more than doubled in the 
second half of 1997 in response to the introduction of Law 9457/1997, which weakened 
minority shareholder protection. Moreover, control values dropped to pre-1997 levels 
when in the beginning of 1999 some of the minority protection rules scrapped by the 
previous legal change were reinstated. 
  Turning to the evidence on credit markets, Djankov et al. (2007) show that private 
credit rises after improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing in a sample 
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that lending volume responds positively to improvements in creditor rights. Visaria 
(2006) estimates the impact of introducing specialized tribunals in India aimed at 
accelerating banks' recovery of non-performing loans.  She finds that the establishment of 
tribunals reduces delinquency in loan repayment by between 3 and 10 percentage points. 
Musacchio (2008) finds that the development of bond markets in Brazil is correlated with 
changes in creditors’ rights. Gamboa and Schneider (2007), in an exhaustive study of 
recent bankruptcy reform in Mexico, show that changes in legal rules lowered the time it 
takes firms to go through bankruptcy proceedings and raised recovery rates
8. 
  A second concern about the law and finance evidence is omitted variables – the 
very reason IV techniques are not suitable for identifying the channels of influence.  How 
do we know that legal origin influences financial development through legal rules, rather 
than some other channel (or perhaps even other rules)?  The most cogent version of this 
critique holds that legal origin influences contract enforcement and the quality of the 
judiciary, and it is through this channel that it effects financial development.  Indeed, we 
know from La Porta et al. (1999, 2004) and Djankov et al. (2003b), as illustrated in Table 
III above, that common law is associated with better contract enforcement.   
  This objection is significant since, in reality, enforcement and rules are not 
entirely separable.  A formalistic judiciary might be better able to enforce bright line 
rules than broad legal standards; an independent judiciary might have a comparative 
advantage at enforcing standards.   One way to address this concern is to control for 
contract enforcement as best we can.  In the regressions above, we control for per capita 
                                                 
8 There is also growing evidence on reforms of entry regulations.  Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2007) for 
the case of Russia and Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira (2007) for the case of Mexico find that reductions in entry 
regulations increase new business startups.    
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as Djankov et al. (2008) and La Porta et al. (2006), also control for the quality of contract 
enforcement from Djankov et al. (2003b), with the result that both the actual legal rules 
and the quality of contract enforcement matter.  For the case of credit markets, Safavian 
and Sharma (2007) show that creditor rights benefit debt markets if the country has a 
good enough court system, but not if it does not.  Djankov et al. (2006) combine the rules 
and their actual enforcement into an integrated measure of debt enforcement efficiency.  
This measure (see Table I above) is highly predictive of debt market development.  The 
available evidence suggests that both good rules and their enforcement matter, and that 
the combination of the two is generally most effective.  
  Another relevant distinction is between legal rules and their interpretation.  One 
view is that the actual legal rules, which might have come from legislation, from 
appellate decisions, or from legislation codifying previous appellate decisions, are shaped 
by legal origins and in turn shape finance.  For example, the extensive approval and 
disclosure procedures for self-dealing transactions discourage them in common law 
countries, as compared to the French civil law countries (Djankov et al. 2008).   
Other writers emphasize the flexibility of judicial decision-making under common 
law.    One version of this argument suggests that common law judges are able or willing 
to enforce more flexible financial contracts, and that such flexibility promotes financial 
development (Gennaioli 2007).  Lerner and Schoar (2005) and Bergman and 
Nikolaievsky (2007) present some evidence in support of this view.  In the context of 
labor markets, Ahlering and Deakin (2005) likewise argue that in civil law countries, 
unlike in common law ones, freedom of contract is counterbalanced by the exercise of 
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conception of the enterprise in the German one.  Pistor (2006) presents a legal and 
historical account of the greater contractual flexibility in common law, the reason being 
that contractual freedom is unencumbered by social conditionality
9.   
A second version of the flexibility thesis stresses the ability of common law 
courts to use broad standards rather than specific rules in rendering their decisions.  This 
ability enables judges to “catch” self-dealing or tunneling, and thereby discourages it.   
Coffee (1999) has famously called this the smell-test of common law.  Johnson et al 
(2000) examine several legal cases concerning tunneling of assets by corporate insiders in 
civil law countries, and find that the bright line rules of civil law allow corporate insiders 
to structure legal transactions that expropriate outside investors.   In contrast, the broader 
standards of common law, such as fiduciary duty, discourage tunneling more effectively.   
At this point, there is evidence supporting both the “laws on the books” and the 
“judicial flexibility” theories.  As we argue in section IV, both interpretations are also 
consistent with the fundamental differences between common and civil law. 
    
Recent Findings on Resource Allocation 
  Recent years have seen an explosion of research on the consequences of legal 
rules and regulations, many of which are related to legal origins, for resource allocation.  
We briefly review this evidence before turning to the interpretation.   
Perhaps the largest body of work concerns the effect of financial development on 
resource allocation.  Many of these papers use LLSV indicators of investor protection, as 
                                                 
9 Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005) dispute the flexibility hypothesis by pointing to the broader range of 
legally acceptable forms of business organization in France than in the United States in the 19
th century.     
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Rajan and Zingales (1998), who find that, in financially developed countries, sectors 
which for technological reasons depend more on external finance, grow faster.   In a 
similar spirit, Wurgler (2000) finds that financially developed countries exhibit a higher 
responsiveness of investment to growth opportunities
10.     
  Several studies use the data from Botero et al. (2004) to examine the effects of 
labor regulation on resource allocation.  Caballero et al. (2004) find that, in countries 
with strong rule of law, higher job security is associated with slower adjustment to shocks 
and lower productivity growth.  Gaëlle and Scarpetta (2007) show that employment 
regulations lead to substitution from permanent to temporary employment.  Haltiwanger 
et al. (2006) and Micco and Pages (2006) find that legal employment protections reduce 
labor turnover.   Cunat and Melitz (2006) find that countries with light labor market 
regulations specialize in volatile industries.  Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2007) study one 
firm operating in 43 countries, and find that employment protections lead to labor 
misallocation, delayed entry, and operation of fewer outlets.   
Entry regulations, another sphere influenced by legal origins, also affect resource 
allocation.  Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) find that entry regulations distort industry 
structure and promote concentration.  Klapper et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2007b) 
show that such regulations stifle entry.  Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006c) report that 
countries with lower entry regulations see more entry in industries that experience 
expanding global demand and technology shifts.   
                                                 
10 Other papers in this area include Claessens and Laeven (2003), Braun (2003), Fisman and Love (2004), 
Beck et al. (2005), Perotti and Volpin (2004), Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006a,b), De Serres et al. (2006), 
and Bekaert et al. (2007).   
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on the structure of production.  Nunn (2007) finds that countries with good contract 
enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific 
investments are more important.  Antras, Desai, and Foley (2007) find that weak investor 
protections limit the scale of multi-national firm activity, increase the reliance on FDI 
flows, and alter the decision to deploy technology through FDI rather than licensing. 
  Finally, a growing body of research shows that costly regulation can reduce the 
benefits of international trade.  Lopez-de-Cordova (2007) finds that exporting firms grow 
4 percentage points faster after trade liberalization in countries with less burdensome 
labor regulations.  Using cross-country data, Freund and Bolaki (2007) show that trade 
openness has a positive impact on per capita income only in countries with low regulation 
of entry.  Chang et al. (2005) present a similar finding for labor market regulation.  
Helpman et al. (2007) find that the probability that two countries trade is smaller when 
the cost of entry regulation is high in both countries.   
  All this evidence suggests that through their effect on finance, labor markets, and 
competition, legal origins indeed influence resource allocation.   This raises the question 
of whether one can take the next step and connect legal origins to aggregate economic 
growth.  This, however, has proved to be difficult, as we explain next. 
  Mahoney (2001) shows that, in the recent period, common law countries have 
grown faster than French legal origin countries.   Mahoney is indeed correct: during 
1960-2000, compared to the common law countries, GDP per capita in the French legal 
origin countries has grown about 0.6 percentage point slower per year.   On the other 
hand, German legal origin countries grew faster than the common law countries.   
  26Depending on the specification, there are similar differences in the growth rates of GDP 
per worker, capital stock per worker, and productivity.   
  These results, however, are not particularly robust.   The growth effects of legal 
origins become weaker once we control for a measure of human capital, namely average 
years of schooling in 1960 – a standard control in such regressions.  Indeed, throughout 
the 1960-2000 period, years of schooling are sharply higher in common law countries 
than in French legal origin ones, even holding per capita income constant.  Interestingly, 
Rostowski and Stacescu (2006) argue that legal origins should enter the growth equation 
precisely through education because England pursued more enlightened educational 
policies in its colonies than did France.  French colonial education was largely guided by 
the idea of assimilation, with French textbooks, French teachers, and instruction in 
French.  The British, in contrast, adapted colonial education to local conditions, and 
taught in vernacular.   This is a very original theory, and we hope it is developed.  
  The most obvious potential channel of influence of legal origins on growth is 
financial development, since legal origins have such strong effects on finance.   Using 
legal origins as instruments, Beck et al. (2000a, b) find that private debt market 
development is a statistically significant and quantitatively important predictor of growth.  
Again, however, one needs to be careful, both because (as we argued above) the 
exclusion restriction is unlikely to be satisfied and because the results are often sensitive 
to the inclusion of other variables, such as alternative measures of human capital.    
  In sum, there is by now a great deal of evidence that legal origins influence legal 
rules and regulations, which in turn have substantial impact on important economic 
outcomes – from financial development, to unemployment, to investment and entry, to 
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that common law is associated with better economic outcomes than French civil law.  
The evidence also shows that legal origins influence patterns of growth within industries, 
but it is less clear that legal origins predict aggregate growth.  The last finding resonates 
with the obvious observation made by LLSV (1998) that countries like France and 
Belgium achieved very living standards despite their legal origin.   One possible 
explanation of the aggregate growth evidence is that civil law countries have found 
compensating mechanisms to overcome the baggage of their legal tradition in the long 
run.  Another possibility is that the last 40 years have been unrepresentative, and that in 
the long run there are periods that advantage civil law regimes (such as state-led growth).  
We do not know which of these, or some other explanation, is correct
11.     
  All this evidence leaves us with a major question: why do legal origins matter, 
and why do they matter in such a pervasive way for both rules and economics outcomes?  
What are the historical and structural differences among common and civil law countries 
that have such pervasive consequences for both the specific legal and regulatory rules and 
major economic outcomes?  In the next section, we attempt to answer this question. 
    
IV. Explaining the Facts 
  The correlations documented in the previous section require an explanation.  
LLSV (1997, 1998) do not advance such an explanation, although in a broader study of 
government institutions, LLSV (1999) follow Hayek (1960) and suggest that common 
law countries are more protective of private property than French legal origin ones.   In 
                                                 
11 We note, however, that the evidence on the relationship between institutions and aggregate growth more 
generally, which seemed substantial a few years ago, has been crumbling (see Glaeser et al. 2004).  
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provide a theoretical foundation for the empirical evidence (see Glaeser and Shleifer 
2002, Djankov et al. 2003c, and Mulligan and Shleifer 2005b).    In this section, we begin 
with the alternative historical explanations, and then try to revise, synthesize and advance 
previous theoretical accounts into the Legal Origins Theory
12. 
    
Revolutionary Explanations   
The standard explanation of the differences between common law and French 
civil law in particular, and to a lesser extent German law, focus on 17
th-19
th century 
developments (Merryman 1969, Zweigert and Kotz 1998, Klerman and Mahoney 2007).  
According to this theory, the English lawyers were on the same winning side as the 
property owners in the Glorious Revolution, and in opposition to the Crown and to its 
courts of royal prerogative.   As a consequence, the English judges gained considerable 
independence from the Crown, including lifetime appointments in the 1701 Act of 
Settlement.   A key corollary of such independence was the respect for private property in 
English law, especially against possible encroachments by the sovereign.  Indeed, 
common law courts acquired the power to review administrative acts: the same principles 
applied to the deprivation of property by public and private actors (Mahoney 2001, p. 
513).  Another corollary is respect for the freedom of contract, including the ability of 
judges to interpret contracts without a reference to public interest (Pistor 2006).  Still 
                                                 
12 Legal Origins Theory is intimately related to the discussion of the varieties of capitalism, which 
(typically in the context of the OECD economies) distinguishes between liberal and coordinated market 
economies, the latter having firms that “depend more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate 
their endeavors with other actors to construct their core competencies” (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 8).  As 
Pistor (2006) points out, all the liberal market economies in the OECD are common law countries, and all 
the coordinated ones are civil law ones.  The literature on the variety of capitalisms has long looked for an 
objective measure of different types; perhaps it should have looked no further than legal origins. 
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rules, thereby becoming an independent source of legal change separate from Parliament.  
Judicial independence and law making powers in turn made judging a highly attractive 
and prestigious occupation.   
  In contrast, the French judiciary was largely monarchist in the 18
th century (many 
judges bought offices from the king), and ended up on the wrong side of the French 
Revolution.   The revolutionaries reacted by seeking to deprive judges of independence 
and law making powers, to turn them into automata in Napoleon’s felicitous phrase.  
Following Montesquieu’s (1748) doctrine of separation of powers, the revolutionaries 
proclaimed legislation as the sole valid source of law, and explicitly denied the 
acceptability of judge-made law.   “For the first time, it was admitted that the sovereign is 
capable of defining law and of reforming it as a whole.  True, this power is accorded to 
him in order to expound the principles of natural law.  But as Cambaceres, principal legal 
adviser to Napoleon, once admitted, it was easy to change this purpose, and legislators, 
outside of any consideration for “natural laws” were to use this power to transform the 
basis of society”  (David and Brierley 1985, p. 60).   
Hayek (1960) traces the differences between common and civil law to distinct 
conceptions of freedom.  He distinguishes two views of freedom directly traceable to the 
predominance of an essentially empiricist view of the world in England and a rationalist 
approach in France.  “One finds the essence of freedom in spontaneity and the absence of 
coercion, the other believes it to be realized only in the pursuit and attainment of an 
absolute social purpose; one stands for organic, slow, self-conscious growth, the other for 
doctrinaire deliberateness; one for trial and error procedure, the other for the enforced 
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profound differences in philosophies of freedom.   
To implement his strategy, Napoleon promulgated several codes of law and 
procedure intended to control judicial decisions in all circumstances.   Judges became 
bureaucrats employed by the State; their positions were seen as largely administrative, 
low-prestige occupations.  The ordinary courts had no authority to review government 
action, making them useless as guarantors of property against the state.   
The diminution of the judiciary was also accompanied by the growth of the 
administrative, as Napoleon created a huge and invasive bureaucracy to implement the 
state’s regulatory policies (Woloch 1994).  Under Napoleon, “the command orders were 
now unity of direction, hierarchically defined participation in public affairs, and above all 
the leading role assigned to the executive bureaucracy, whose duty was to force the pace 
and orient society through the application from above of increasingly comprehensive 
administrative regulations and practices” (Woolf 1992, p. 95).      
  Merryman (1969, p. 30) explains the logic of codification:  “If the legislature 
alone could make laws and the judiciary could only apply them (or, at a later time, 
interpret and apply them), such legislation had to be complete, coherent, and clear.  If a 
judge were required to decide a case for which there was no legislative provision, he 
would in effect make law and thus violate the principle of rigid separation of powers.  
Hence it was necessary that the legislature draft a code without gaps.  Similarly, if there 
were conflicting provisions in the code, the judge would make law by choosing one 
rather than another as more applicable to the situation.  Hence there could be no 
conflicting provisions.  Finally, if a judge were allowed to decide what meaning to give 
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Hence the code had to be clear.” 
  Yet, according to Merryman (1996), Napoleon’s experiment failed in France, as 
the notion that legislation can foresee all future circumstances proved unworkable.  Over 
decades, new French courts were created, and they as well as older courts increasingly 
became involved in the interpretation of codes, which amounted to the creation of new 
legal rules.  Even so, the law-making role of French courts was never explicitly 
acknowledged, and never achieved the scope of their English counterparts.   
Perhaps more importantly for cross-country analysis, the developing countries 
into which the French legal system was transplanted apparently adhered faithfully to the 
Napoleonic vision.  In those countries, judges stuck to the letter of the code, resolving 
disputes based on formalities even when the law needed refinement.  Enriques (2002) 
shows that, even today, Italian magistrates let corporate insiders expropriate investors 
with impunity, as long as formally correct corporate decision making procedures are 
followed.  In the transplant and to some extent even in the origin countries, legislation 
remained, at least approximately, the sole source of law, judicial law-making stayed close 
to non-existent, and judges retained their bureaucratic status.  Merryman memorably 
writes that “when the French exported their system, they did not include the information 
that it really does not work that way, and failed to include the blueprint of how it actually 
does work” (1996, p. 116).  This analysis of the “French deviation” may explain the 
considerable dynamism of the French law as compared to its transplant countries, where 
legal development stagnated.   The French emphasis on centralized bureaucratic control 
may have been the most enduring influence of transplantation.  
  32  Although less has been written about German law, it is fair to say that it is a bit of 
a hybrid (Dawson 1960, 1968, Merryman 1969, Zweigert and Kötz 1998).  Like the 
French courts, German courts had little independence.  However, they had greater power 
to review administrative acts, and jurisprudence was explicitly recognized as a source of 
law, accommodating greater legal change.    
  The historical analysis has three key implications for the economic consequences 
of legal origins.  First, the built-in judicial independence of common law, particularly in 
the cases of administrative acts affecting individuals, suggests that common law is likely 
to be more respectful of private property and contract than civil law.     
Second, common law’s emphasis on judicial resolution of private disputes, as 
opposed to legislation, as a solution to social problems, suggests that we are likely to see 
greater emphasis on private contracts and orderings, and less emphasis on government 
regulation, in common law countries.  To the extent that there is regulation, it aims to 
facilitate private contracting rather than to direct particular outcomes.  Pistor (2006) 
describes French legal origin as embracing socially-conditioned private contracting, in 
contrast to common law’s support for unconditioned private contracting.  Damaska 
(1986) calls civil law “policy-implementing,” and common law “dispute resolving.”    
Third, the greater respect for jurisprudence as a source of law in the common law 
countries, especially as compared to the French civil law countries, suggests that common 
law will be more adaptable to the changing circumstances, a point emphasized by Hayek 
(1960) and more recently Levine (2005).  These adaptability benefits of common law 
have also been noted by scholars in law and economics (Posner 1973, Rubin 1977, Priest 
1977, Ponzetto and Fernandez 2008), who have made the stronger claim that through 
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actually toward efficient legal rules.  The extreme hypothesis of common law’s efficiency 
is difficult to sustain either theoretically or empirically, but recent research does suggest 
that the ability of judges to react to changing circumstances – the adaptability of common 
law – tends to improve the law’s quality over time.  For example, Gennaioli and Shleifer 
(2007) argue in the spirit of Cardozo (1921) and Stone (1985) that the central strategy of 
judicial law-making is distinguishing cases from precedents, which has an unintended 
benefit that the law responds to a changing environment.   The quality of law improves 
on average even when judges pursue their policy preferences; law making does not need 
to be benevolent.   
The theoretical research on the adaptability of common law has received some 
empirical support in the work of Beck et al. (2003), who show that the acceptability of 
case law variable from La Porta et al. (2004) captures many of the benefits of common 
law for financial and other outcomes.  On the other hand, a recent study of the evolution 
of legal doctrine governing construction disputes in the US over the period of 1970-2005 
finds little evidence either that legal rules converge over time, or that they move toward 
efficient solutions (Niblett, Posner, and Shleifer 2007). 
  
Medieval  Explanations   
  The idea that the differences between common and civil law manifest themselves 
for the first time during the Enlightenment seems a bit strange to anyone who has heard 
of Magna Carta.  Some of the differences were surely sharpened, or even created, by the 
English and the French Revolutions.   For example, judges looked to past judicial 
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Moccia 1981).  However, the explicit reliance on precedent as a source of law (and the 
term precedent itself) is only a 17
th and 18
th century development in England (Berman 
2003).  Likewise, the denial of the legal status of precedent in France is a Napoleonic 
rather than an earlier development.   
But in other respects, important differences predate the revolutions.  The English 
judges fought the royal prerogative, used juries to try criminal cases, and pressed the 
argument that the King (James) was not above the law early in the 17
th century.  They 
looked down on the inquisitorial system that flourished on the Catholic continent.   In 
light of such history, it is hard to sustain the argument that the differences between 
common and civil law only emerged through revolutions.    
  Several distinguished legal historians, including Dawson (1960) and Berman 
(1983), trace the divergence between French and English law to a much earlier period, 
namely the 12
th and 13
th centuries.   According to this view, the French Crown, which 
barely had full control over the Ile de France let alone other parts of France, adopted the 
bureaucratic inquisitorial system of the Roman Church as a way to unify and perhaps 
control the country.  The system persisted in this form through the centuries, although 
judicial independence at times increased as judges bought their offices from the Crown.  
Napoleonic bureaucratization and centralization of the judiciary is seen as a culmination 
of a centuries-old tug of war between the center and the regions.   
  England, in contrast, developed jury trials as far back as the 12
th century, and 
enshrined the idea that the Crown cannot take the life or property of the nobles without 
due process in the Magna Carta in 1215.   The Magna Carta stated: “No freeman shall be 
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go or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the 
land.”  The Magna Carta established the foundations of the English legal order.  As in 
France, such independence was continuously challenged by the Crown, and the courts of 
royal prerogative, subordinate to the Crown, grew in importance in the 16
th century, 
during the reign of Queen Elizabeth.  Yet, as we indicated earlier, even during 
Elizabeth’s reign, and much more so during those of James I and Charles I, Parliament 
and courts repeatedly reaffirmed the rights of individuals against royal demands.  Chief 
Judge Edward Coke’s early 17
th century insistence that the king is not above the law is 
neither a continental nor a post-revolutionary phenomenon.  The Glorious Revolution 
eliminated the courts of royal prerogative, and eventually enshrined the principles of 
judicial independence in several acts of Parliament.  
  Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) present a theoretical model intended to capture this 
comparative 12
th and 13
th century narrative, but with an economic twist.  They argue that 
England was a relatively peaceful country during this period, in which decentralized 
dispute resolution on the testimony of independent knights (juries) was efficient.  France 
was a less peaceful country, in which high nobles had the power to subvert decentralized 
justice, and hence a much more centralized system, organized, maintained, and protected 
by the sovereign, was required to administer the law.  Roman law provided the backbone 
of such a system.  This view sees the developments of 17
th and 18
th centuries as 
reinforcing the structures that evolved over the previous centuries.    
  Regardless of whether the revolutionary or the medieval story is correct, they 
have very similar empirical predictions.  In the medieval narrative, as in the revolutionary 
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sympathy of the judiciary toward private property and contract, especially against 
infringements by the executive.   In both narratives, judicial law making and adaptation 
play a greater role in common than in civil law, although this particular difference might 
have been greatly expanded in the Age of Revolutions.  The historical accounts may 
differ in detail, but they lead to the same place as to the fundamental features of law.  
These features, then, carry through the process of transplantation, and appear in the 
differences among legal families.   
 
Legal Origins Theory 
  Legal Origins Theory has three basic ingredients.  First, regardless or whether the 
medieval or the revolutionary narrative is the best one, by the 18
th or 19
th centuries 
England and Continental Europe, particularly France, have developed very different 
styles of social control of business, and institutions supporting these styles.   Second, 
these styles of social control, as well as legal institutions supporting them, were 
transplanted by the origin countries to most of the world, rather than written from scratch.  
Third, although a great deal of legal and regulatory change has occurred, these styles 
have proved persistent in addressing social problems.    
Djankov et al. (2003c) propose a particular way of thinking about the alternative 
legal styles.  All legal systems seek to simultaneously address twin problems: the 
problem of disorder or market failure, and the problem of dictatorship or state abuse.  
There is an inherent tradeoff in addressing these twin problems:  as the state becomes 
more assertive in dealing with disorder, it may also become more abusive.  We can think 
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relatively more concerned with disorder, and relatively less with dictatorship, in finding 
solutions to social and economic problems.  In contrast, the common law family is 
relatively more concerned with dictatorship, and less with disorder.   These are the basic 
attitudes or styles of the legal and regulatory systems, which influence the “tools” they 
use to deal with social concerns.  Of course, common law does not mean anarchy, as the 
government has always maintained a heavy hand of social control; nor does civil law 
mean dictatorship.  Indeed, both systems seek a balance between private disorder and 
public abuse of power.  But they seek it in different ways: common law by shoring up 
markets, civil law by restricting them or even replacing them with state commands. 
Legal Origins Theory raises the obvious question of how the influence of legal 
origins has persisted over the decades or even centuries.  Why so much hysterisis?  What 
is it that the British brought on the boat that was so different from what the French or the 
Spaniards brought, and that had such persistent consequences?  They key point to realize 
is that transplantation involves not just specific legal rules (many of which actually 
change later), but also legal institutions (or which judicial independence might be the 
most important), human capital of the participants in the legal system, and crucially the 
strategy of the law for dealing with new problems.  Successive generations of judges, 
lawyers, and politicians all learn the same broad ideas of how the law and the state should 
work.  The legal system supplies the fundamental tools for addressing social concerns, 
and it is that system, as defined by Zweigert and Kotz, with its codes, distinctive 
institutions, modes of thought and even ideologies, that is very slow to change.  
  38The fact that legal system is slow to change does not mean that specific legal rules 
and regulations never change.  As we discuss below, governments in both common and 
civil law countries entered many new spheres of social control in the 20
th century, but 
typically in ways consistent with their legal traditions.   In some more stable areas of law, 
such as legal procedure, there is sometimes a great deal of rigidity even in the specific 
rules.   Balas et al. (2007) compute the index of the formalism of legal procedure, 
considered in Table II, for 20 common law and 20 civil law countries over the period 
1950-2000.   Consistent with Djankov et al. (2003b), they find that formalism is higher in 
common than in civil law countries in 2000, but also in 1950.  Perhaps more surprisingly, 
formalism is extraordinarily stable.   Among common law countries, the average of the 
ratio of 2000 to 1950 procedural formalism is .90; among civil law countries the average 
of this ratio is 1.10.   The data reflects significant persistence of the differences among 
legal origins, with no evidence of convergence.     
The reader might wonder at this point whether Legal Origin Theory simply 
identifies legal families with different “ideologies” or “cultures.”  To the extent that 
ideologies or cultures refer to the beliefs about how the law should deal with social 
problems, Legal Origin Theory clearly accepts the view that ideologies and cultures are 
crucial for the persistent influence of legal families.  But the central point is that the 
reason for persistence is that the beliefs and ideologies become incorporated in legal 
rules, institutions, and education, and as such are transmitted from one generation to the 
next.   It is this incorporation of beliefs and ideologies into the legal and political 
infrastructure that enables legal origins to have such persistent consequences for rules, 
regulations, and economic outcomes.     
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new needs both across activities and over time.  Essentially, the toolkit of civil law 
features more prominently such policies as nationalization and direct state control; the 
toolkit of common law features more litigation and market-supporting regulation.  
Mulligan and Shleifer (2005b) argue that, by specializing in such “policy-implementing” 
solutions, the civil law system tends to expand the scope of government control to new 
activities when a need arises.  Perhaps the best known historical example of this is the 
vast expansion of military conscription in France under Napoleon, made possible by the 
already existing presence of government bureaucracy that could administer the draft in 
every French village (Woloch 1994).  Because the state’s presence on the ground is less 
pervasive under the common law, it tends not to rely as extensively on administrative 
solutions, and more on “market-supporting” or “dispute-resolving” ones.   
Likewise, one can argue that, when the market system gets into trouble or into a 
crisis, the civil law approach is to repress it or to replace it with state mandates, while the 
common law approach is to shore it up.  One place to see this might be the regulatory 
response to the Great Depression and financial crises of the 20
th century.  According to 
Morck and Steier (2005), “the responses of the Dutch, Italian, Japanese, and Swedish 
governments to the financial crisis of the 1920s and 1930s were to substitute various 
mechanisms of state-controlled capital allocation for their stock markets (p. 39).”  “A 
similar succession of financial manias, panics, and crises in Britain, Canada, and the 
United States ultimately strengthened shareholder rights (p. 39).”  The United States 
responded to the Great Depression by introducing securities regulation and deposit 
insurance.  These strategies intended to rehabilitate and support markets, not to replace 
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contrast between the replacement of markets by state solutions in civil law countries, and 
the rehabilitation of markets in common law countries, appears quite pervasive.    
One form of government reaction to new circumstances is the expansion of public 
involvement into new spheres.  Economic historians have sometimes argued that because 
legal origins have differed for centuries, one should observe equally sharp differences in 
rules and regulations in the 19
th century as well.  This, of course, does not follow.  To the 
extent that public intervention in markets changes over time and responds to social needs 
or political imperatives, laws and regulations will change as well, but in ways that are 
consistent with legal traditions.  Both labor laws and securities laws are creatures of the 
20
th century; they were introduced as a response to perceived social needs.   Yet, as the 
evidence in section III shows, these laws took different forms in countries from different 
legal traditions, consistent with broad strategies of how the state intervenes. 
Ahlering and Deakin (2005) elaborate this point in the context of labor laws.  
They argue that the current differences between the labor laws of Britain and Continental 
Europe can be traced to the differences in the ways common and civil law systems saw 
the role of the enterprise as far back as the Industrial Revolution.  Common law saw the 
enterprise as an unencumbered property or the employer, with the workers relegated to 
contractual claims on the surplus from production.  In contrast, civil law saw property 
and responsibility as two sides of the same coin.  Thus, the support provided by the legal 
system to the freedom of contract and property rights was counterbalanced in the French 
tradition by the exercise of public power for the protection of workers, and in the 
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Deakin suggest that these differences in “legal cultures” persist even today.     
Crucially, the Legal Origins Theory does not say that common law always works 
better for the economy.  As Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003) show, regulation and state 
control may well be efficient responses to disorder, where common-law solutions fail to 
sustain markets.
13  Indeed, all countries efficiently resort to the quintessentially civil law 
solution of planning in time of war, and add good dollops of state intervention and 
control in response to major threats to order, such as terrorism.  Glaeser and Shleifer 
(2003) interpret the early 20
th century rise of the regulatory state in the US as an efficient 
response to the subversion of the justice system by large corporations. 
Legal Origin Theory also does not imply that the outcomes we observe are always 
or even typically efficient within a given legal family.   There are several reasons for 
inefficiency, quite aside from interest group politics.  First, at the most basic level, the 
tools used by a legal system may lead to outcomes that are worse than the initial problem.  
Excessive regulation of entry in civil law countries is a good example.  Second, courts or 
legislators in a country might bring into one domain a set of tools that has been used in 
another, based on either philosophical outlook or a desire for consistency, with adverse 
results.  For example, the strategy of extensive interlocutory appeals that is standard in a 
civil law system can slow down a bankruptcy proceeding, where time is of the essence, 
and lead to a large loss of value (Djankov et al. 2006).   Third, additional inefficiencies 
may arise from transplantation.  A regulatory approach that works well in France may 
become little but a source of corruption and delay in a poor West African country.   As 
                                                 
13 Crucially from the perspective of the developing countries, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) show that when 
all mechanisms of state action can be subverted by private interests, the best policy might be to do nothing 
and leave the markets alone, even in the presence of substantial market failure.  
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Legal Origins Theory can form the basis of reform.   
To reiterate, no country exhibits a system of social control that is an ideal type; all 
countries mix the two approaches.  Common law countries are quite capable of civil law 
solutions, and vice versa.  Nonetheless, the empirical prediction of the Legal Origin 
Theory is that the differences between legal origins are deep enough that we observe 
them expressed in the different strategies of social control of economic life even after 
centuries of legal and regulatory evolution.  Perhaps because the legal system is such a 
difficult-to-change element of social order, supported by legal institutions, human capital 
and expectations, legal origins survive both time and transplantation.  This, we submit, is 
what gives them explanatory power.    
 
Interpretation of the Evidence 
  In interpreting the evidence in light of the Legal Origins Theory, it is easiest to 
proceed in reverse: from judicial independence to government regulation to finance.  The 
evidence on judicial independence directly confirms the predictions.  As we saw in Table 
III, compared to French civil law, common law countries have less formalized contract 
enforcement, longer constitutional tenure of Supreme Court judges (a direct indicator of 
independence), and greater recognition of case law as a source of law, which Beck et al. 
(2003) use as an indicator of adaptability.  Also consistent with the Legal Origins Theory, 
these characteristics of legal systems predict both the efficiency of contract enforcement 
– measured objectively and subjectively – and the security of property rights.   
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Theory as well.  The historical evidence suggests that civil law countries are more likely 
to address social problems through government ownership and mandates, whereas 
common law countries are more likely to do so through private contract and litigation.   
When common law countries regulate, we expect their regulation to support private 
contracting rather than dictate outcomes.  We see those differences across a broad range 
of activities – from entry and labor regulation to recruitment of armies.  We also see that 
civil law countries exhibit heavier government ownership of both the media and banks.   
   The theory is also consistent with the evidence on finance.  The better protection 
of both shareholders and creditors in common law countries than especially in the French 
civil law ones is consistent with the principal historical narrative of the greater security of 
private property and better contract enforcement under common law.  Moreover, as noted 
by Beck et al (2003), financial markets may be an area where the adaptability of judge-
made rules, as exemplified by the American Delaware courts, is especially beneficial.   
  Roe (2006) points out that many of the legal rules protecting investors in common 
law countries are statutory rather than judge-made, so in many crucial respects regulation 
rather than judge-made law is responsible for investor protection.  Securities laws in 
general and disclosure rules in particular, which La Porta et al. (2006) show to provide 
some of the most effective investor protections, are entirely statutory.   Jackson and Roe 
(2007) further argue that the budgets and staffing levels of securities regulators, which 
are higher in common law countries, predict financial development.  Is this evidence 
consistent with Legal Origins Theory?       
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because their regulatory strategies seek to sustain markets rather than replace them.   
Returning to the examples of securities regulation and of the often-statutory regulation of 
self-dealing transactions, the statutory requirements of disclosure originate in the 
common law of fiduciary relationships.  Market forces on their own are not strong 
enough, and contract claims not cheap enough to pursue, to protect investors from being 
cheated.  A regulatory framework that offers and enforces such protection, and makes it 
easier for investors to seek legal remedies to rectify the wrongs even when doing so relies 
on public action, allows more extensive financial contracting.   The form of statutory 
protection of investors in common law countries, as compared to civil law countries, is 
consistent with Legal Origins Theory.  Finance falls into line with other evidence.     
 
V. Legal Origins and Culture. 
  In this section and the next two, we address the central criticism of research on 
legal origins: that they are merely proxy for other factors influencing legal rules and 
outcomes.   The three factors we consider are culture, history, and politics.  We stress 
from the outset that it is not our position, nor our objective in these sections, to show that 
culture, history, or politics, are unimportant for legal and regulatory rules.  All of them 
are clearly important, and there is a great deal of evidence confirming their roles (see, 
e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004, 2006 on the role of culture).   Our point is 
rather to establish, as clearly as possible, a much more modest yet central to the Legal 
Origins Theory proposition that legal origins are not proxies for something else.   
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the evidence on legal origins.  Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggest that, in light of the 
hostility of some of the religious traditions to lending on interest, religion may be a more 
fundamental determinant of legal rules governing creditor protection than legal tradition.  
Licht et al. (2005) present a more sweeping case, using sociological measures of cultural 
attitudes to predict legal rules.  So are legal origins merely proxies for cultural variables?  
Table IV shows the facts.  First, religion is not nearly as important a determinant 
of creditor rights as legal origin (see Djankov et al. 2007).  Second, most indices of 
cultural attitudes do not influence creditor rights holding legal origin constant.   There is 
some evidence that a nation’s masculinity (defined as “the degree to which the society 
reinforces, or does not reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of 
achievement, control, and power”) is not conducive to creditor protection, while belief in 
the independence of children is, but neither variable makes much of a dent in the effect of 
legal origin on creditor rights. 
Cultural variables, then, do not make much of a dent in the explanatory power of 
legal origins.  We note, however, that we have used the sociological notions of what 
culture is, focusing on religion and broad social attitudes.   One can alternatively include 
in culture something like “legal culture,” which would make culture indistinguishable 
from legal origins.    This theory of culture, of course, we do not reject. 
 
VI.  Legal Origins and Politics.     
  A broader challenge to the explanatory power of legal origins has been posed by 
political theories of corporate finance.   There are now many papers in this literature, 
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Perotti and von Thadden (2006), and Roe (2000, 2006), and even a recent survey by 
Haber and Perotti (2007).  Although the papers differ in detail, they have a common 
theme, so we take the liberty of providing an integrated account.   Also, while some of 
the papers cover developing countries, virtually all of them deal with Western Europe, or 
the Wealthy West, a point we return to below.     
  According to the political theories, sometime in the middle of the 20
th century, 
Continental European countries formed alliances between families that controlled firms 
and (typically organized) labor.  In many cases, these alliances were a response to crises 
from hyperinflation, depression, or defeat in war.  These political alliances sought to win 
elections in order to secure the economic rents of the insiders, and to keep them from the 
“outsiders,” such as unorganized labor, minority shareholders, corporate challengers, or 
potential entrants.  When these alliances won elections, they wrote legal rules to benefit 
themselves.   The families secured poor protection of outside shareholders, so they could 
hold on to the private benefits of control.  Labor got social security and worker protection 
laws, which maintained employment and wages of the insiders.  Both the families and 
labor secured the laws protecting them against product market competition, such as 
regulation of entry.   The legal rules observed in the data, then, are outcomes of this 
democratic process, and not of any “permanent” conditions, such as legal origins. 
  The political story is part of a broader narrative of Continental European history 
in the 20
th century, in which the response to crisis is variously characterized by the rise of 
proportional representation (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, Persson and Tabellini 2003), 
socialist politics (Alesina and Glaeser 2004), and social democracy (Roe 2000).   The 
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adopted on the Continent.  Some implications of these theories are broadly consistent 
with the evidence: countries that have strong shareholder protection indeed have weak 
protection of labor and low regulation of entry.  The suggestion of this research is that 
legal origin enters the various regressions summarized in Section III spuriously, with 
French (and German) legal origins serving as proxies for – depending on the exact paper 
– social democracy, leftist politics, or proportional representation.  If politics were 
appropriately controlled for in the regressions, legal origin would not matter.   
The political story is plausible, since we see social democracies in Continental 
Europe but not in the United States.   For this reason, we consider it in some detail.  We 
do so in three steps.  First, we briefly look at the logic of the story.  Second, we show 
what happens when some of the political variables proposed in this literature are actually 
added to the regression.  Third, we test an implication of the available political models, 
namely that the formation of laws is a consequence of democratic politics
14.  This 
prediction implies, most immediately, that the relationship between legal origins and laws 
should not hold outside democracies.  
  With respect to the logic of the story, it is hard to understand why organized labor 
accepts rules that facilitate the diversion of corporate wealth, or tunneling – something 
we see on a fairly large scale in, say, Italy or Belgium.  We can see the argument for the 
Swedish system, in which the leading families stay in control, but are kept on a tight 
leash through government regulations, and certainly not allowed to expropriate investors.  
Sweden indeed has a valuable stock market and low private benefits of control.   It is 
                                                 
14 Haber and Perotti (2007, p. 4) write: “Recent explanations suggest that a democratic majority in 
countries hit by a major redistribution of wealth may shift in favor of low minority investor protection and 
less corporate restructuring and competition to protect established labor rents.” 
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since presumably such wealth could be taxed or shared with the workers.   
   But what do the data say?  Table V presents regressions of the legal and 
institutional rules on three variables considered by the political theories.  The first one is 
proportional representation, the form of democracy seen as an adaptation to political 
demands of labor in the early 20
th century (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, Persson and 
Tabellini 2003).  We obviously run these regressions for democracies only.  The second 
variable, collected by Botero et al. (2004) for 85 countries, is the share of years between 
1928-1995 when the chief executive and the largest party in the legislature were leftist or 
centrist.  The third variable is union density, defined as the percentage of the total work 
force affiliated to labor unions in 1997.  The regressions in Table V cover the whole 
sample and are not confined to Western Europe or the OECD.    
  For all three variables, the results in Table V are straightforward.  Political 
variables explain the variation in legal rules only occasionally.  In contrast, legal origins 
continue to explain the variation even with political variables in the regression, and the 
difference between common law and French civil law remains highly statistically 
significant.  This is true for all three political variables aiming to get at the political 
explanation of legal rules.  While each political variable is surely measured with error, 
and our specifications surely do not capture the full subtlety of the political theories, 
political variables are rarely significant.  In contrast, legal origins are consistently 
significant, even with political variables in the regression.   
  We next ask whether legal origins only have an effect in democracies, which 
would be the case if they were proxies for the political sentiment of the majority.  In this 
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Legal Origins Theory, they should predict legal rules in autocracies as well.  In Table VI, 
we focus on autocracies (countries with a positive autocracy score from Alvarez et al. 
2000).   For nearly all our variables, the differences between common law and French 
legal origin remain significant among autocracies.  This result holds for other measures of 
non-democratic government as well.  We see this evidence as a direct rejection of the 
hypothesis that legal origins are proxies for the political sentiment of the democratic 
majority.   Political theories can perhaps be adjusted to incorporate autocracies, but the 
data suggest that legal origins are quite distinct from political sentiment. 
  None of this is to say that politics is unimportant for either legal rules or 
economic outcomes.   Indeed, political change may provide the impetus for countries to 
revise their laws and regulations.  But the thrust of Legal Origins Theory is that, even in 
response to political demands, countries will design reforms consistently with their legal 
traditions.   Legal origins are not proxies for leftist politics.         
 
VII.  Legal Origins and History.  
  Perhaps the most difficult challenge to the hypothesis that legal origins cause 
outcomes has been posed by historical arguments.  Because virtually all of these 
arguments focus on finance, we likewise focus on finance in this section, but bearing in 
mind that an alternative theory must address all the evidence.  At the broadest level, 
historical arguments suggest that the positive correlation between common law and 
finance is a 20
th century phenomenon.   According to the critics, if one looks at historical 
data, particularly from the early 20
th century, the correlation does not exist.  Because 
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th century, they cannot, say the critics, account for the 
differences in financial development.   
  It is useful to break down the historical argument into three component parts, and 
to address them sequentially.  This also allows us to consider several influential papers.  
  First, Rajan and Zingales (2003) present evidence showing that in 1913, French 
civil law countries had more developed financial markets than common law countries.  In 
their sample, as of 1913, the five common law countries had the average stock market to 
GDP ratio of 53%, compared to 66% for the ten French civil law countries.   
  Second, several writers maintain that shareholder protection in Britain at the 
beginning of the 20
th century was minimal.  The evidence that Britain was financially 
developed at the time, including having some ownership dispersion, must therefore be 
accounted for not by law, but by alternative mechanisms, such as trust and financial 
intermediaries (Cheffins 2001, Franks et al. 2005).  
  Third, the historical critique holds that the correlation between common law and 
financial development emerges over the 20
th century, a finding it sees as inconsistent with 
LLSV.  In contrast to the superiority of financial development in the French legal origin 
countries, as compared to the common law countries, circa 1913, Rajan and Zingales find 
that the respective average stock market for common law and French civil law countries 
were 130% and 74% by 1999.  They call this the Great Reversal (see Figure III).   
Critics propose two explanations of how common law countries came to excel in 
finance.   The first is the political argument, namely that common law countries happened 
to have more favorable democratic politics, which we have already discussed.  In 
addition, according to Roe (2006), civil law countries suffered greater destruction during 
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capital laws and regulations.   
     It is easiest to take up the three pieces of the historical critique in turn. 
 
 Stock Markets at the Start of the 20
th Century 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) present data on stock market development for 6 
common law and 18 civil law countries (10 of them French civil law) starting in 1913.  
To do so, they find a separate data source for each country that reports aggregate stock 
market capitalization.  Their findings of a higher ratio of stock market value to GDP in 
civil than in common law countries (the variable used by LLSV 1997, 1998), reproduced 
in Table VII and illustrated in Figure III, is the starting point of most historical critiques 
of LLSV, as well as of political accounts of finance in the 20
th century. 
  We have looked at some of the Rajan and Zingales’s data using their own sources.  
Here we focus on stock market capitalization as a measure of financial development.  
Conceptually, the measure of a country’s stock market capitalization relevant for testing 
the influence of legal origins is the capitalization of equities listed on that country’s stock 
exchange(s) whose shareholders are subject to protection of that country’s laws.  
Impressively, Rajan and Zingales undertook to find such numbers, but doing so for the 
early 20
th century is especially difficult for two reasons.  First, many – perhaps even most 
-- securities that traded on stock exchanges were bonds rather than stocks, and most of 
those were government bonds.  Second, many of the companies listed on the exchanges 
of developing countries were incorporated (and therefore subject to shareholder 
protection rules), and even had their primary listings, in Europe or the U.S. (see Wilkins 
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overestimate of market value of equities subject to national shareholder protection laws.   
Take a few examples.  In 1913, the most financially developed country in the 
Rajan and Zingales sample is Cuba.  Cuba at that time is a French legal origin country, 
but also an American colony, with a reported stock market capitalization to GDP ratio of 
219%.   We have looked at this observation, and discovered that if one excludes bonds 
and only looks at stocks, the actual ratio falls to 33%.   Moreover, by far the largest 
company with its stock listed in Cuba is Havana Electric, a company incorporated in New 
Jersey, subject to New Jersey laws, and with a primary listing in New York.  We suspect 
that concerns of Havana Electric shareholders would have been addressed by either New 
Jersey courts or the US marines.  Many other companies listed in Cuba appear to be like 
Havana Electric; indeed – and perhaps not surprisingly – there does not seem to be much 
of an indigenously Cuban stock market valuation at all.  Given the small size of their 
sample, the elimination of bonds from the Cuban data point by itself reduces the Rajan 
and Zingales 1913 average French civil law stock market to capitalization ratio from 66% 
to 47%, below their common law estimated average.   
The second most financially developed country in the 1913 Rajan and Zingales 
sample is also a French civil law country, namely Egypt, with a stock market to GDP 
ratio of 109%.   It appears from Tignor (1984) that this ratio, as for Cuba, includes debt.  
Moreover, virtually all of the largest companies listed in Egypt were incorporated in 
England or in France, and many were listed there as well.  (Egypt in 1913 was under 
British protection.)  We estimate that a correct observation for Egypt (specifically, a 
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French civil law average in 1913 by 6 percentage points.    
Some corrections appear to be in order for the rich countries as well.  For France, 
Rajan and Zingales estimate a ratio of 78%.  A more recent estimate by Bozio (2002) 
puts this number at 54%.  Sylla (2006) criticizes Rajan and Zingales for presenting too 
low a number of 39% for the United States, and proposes the alternative 95% from 
Goldsmith (1985).  Both of these corrections favor the common law countries.  The 
various corrections together, especially the one for Cuba, put the common law average 
stock market to GDP ratio comfortably ahead of the French civil law one in 1913.    
To be sure, we have selected Cuba and Egypt non-randomly as two obviously 
bizarre observations.  A more systematic treatment of the data would reveal over-
estimates in common law, and not just civil law, countries.  Some such errors are 
inevitable, and we have ourselves made many even with more recent data.  What is 
beyond doubt, however, is that the strong conclusions reached by Rajan and Zingales on 
comparative financial development cannot be drawn from their sample.  
  Perhaps a better way to get at this issue is to compare the two mother countries: 
England and France.  Rajan and Zingales recognize that England was more financially 
developed than France at the start of the century, but the comparison can be expanded 
because Bozio (2002) reports new numbers for France, and adequate data are available 
for Britain from Michie (1999).  Michie’s numbers of the value of the stock market 
include corporate bonds, so we correct them using data from Goldsmith (1985).   
In Figure IV, we present Bozio’s numbers for France and adjusted numbers for 
domestic stocks in Britain.   The results show that Britain always had a higher stock 
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1913, but also before and after.   
We can also look at Goldsmith’s (1985) data on the ratio of stock market to GDP, 
reproduced in Table VIII.
15   The first point that emerges from the table is that, consistent 
with Kindleberger’s (1984) assessment of Paris as a financial backwater, Britain is ahead 
of France as far back as the middle of the 19
th century, and perhaps even earlier.   So, 
interestingly, is the United States.  Goldsmith’s sample allows also for a more general 
comparison of common and civil law countries in 1913.  If we pull in the US observation 
from 1912, Goldsmith only has 4 common law countries, and 7 civil law ones.  Even so, 
with India pulling the common law average sharply down and no poor civil law countries 
in the sample, the common law average in 1913 is 88%, the French legal origin average 
based only on France and Belgium is 77%, and the overall civil law average is 69%.  
Goldsmith’s data have many problems of their own, and we have not examined them 
closely.  But they independently confirm the point that the relative financial 
underdevelopment of common law countries at the start of the 20
th century is a myth.    
  We conclude that common law countries appear to be more financially developed 
than civil law ones at the start of the 20
th century, and in particular Britain is ahead of 
France.  Over the course of the 20
th century, the differences widen, a divergence that 
needs to be explained.  But the puzzle is divergence, not reversal.   
 
Britain at the Start of the 20
th Century 
                                                 
15 Goldsmith’s (1985) data for corporate stock includes unlisted firms.  In practice, information on 
corporate shares “… is generally limited to securities listed on exchanges, so that comprehensive figures 
must be derived, if at all, by a blowup, often on a precarious basis” (page 337).  
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stock market at the beginning of the 20
th century, with beginnings of ownership 
dispersion, but that this had nothing to do with the law (Cheffins 2001, Franks et al. 
2005).   Looking both at the LLSV indices of shareholder protection and at legal rulings, 
this research sees the rights of minority shareholders in the UK as only weakly protected.  
With the law playing a minor role, the researchers credit financial development in 
England to other mechanisms, such as the bonding role of intermediaries and trust.   
  The position that British shareholders were utterly unprotected has proved 
controversial.   Several authors, for example, argue that Britain led the world in securities 
regulation in general, and corporate disclosure in particular (Coffee 2001, Gower 1954, 
Sylla and Smith 1995).  Britain passed the Directors Liability Act in 1890, and 
Companies Act in 1900, with the effects of both mandating significant disclosure in the 
prospectus, and of holding directors accountable for inaccuracies.   Subsequent 
legislation in the early 20
th century, according to Coffee (2001), mandated on-going 
financial disclosure, and addressed some abuses in the new issues market.  Britain also 
had perhaps the best commercial courts in the world, with most professional and least 
corrupt judges, with centuries of precedents and experience in dealing with fraud.   
  This small literature is at a standstill, with some writers arguing the British 
shareholder protection glass was half empty, and others countering that it was half full.  
What makes this debate utterly frustrating is that it is not comparative, so except with a 
few remarks on Britain versus the US (Coffee 2001), we know very little of how the 
British shareholders were protected compared to the French and German ones.  To the 
extent that the literature has a bottom line, it is that shareholder rights have improved 
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th century, parallel to the growth of its 
markets.   Explaining this parallel growth is a challenge to the Legal Origins Theory.  
 
World War II Destruction  
  Roe (2006) claims that poor economic performance, particularly associated with 
the destruction of capital stocks in World War II, radicalized continental European 
politics, leading to legal rules that were hostile to financial markets and favorable to 
labor.  To test this theory, Roe regresses modern ownership concentration on GDP 
growth between 1913 and 1945 in a sample of 27 countries, and finds that countries with 
worse economic growth have higher ownership concentration.  Roe’s results fall apart, 
however, if we use a broader sample of countries, if we use alternative measures of 
financial development (e.g. stock market capitalization, block premium, or private 
credit), or if we look at other predictions of his theory.   Begin with ownership.  Since 
there is no generally accepted scientific reason to selectively throw out data, we use the 
full available sample to run the Roe regression.  When we do so, the correlation reported 
by Roe disappears, as illustrated in Figure V.  This is not surprising: many developing 
countries stayed out of World War II, yet remained financially underdeveloped.  
Continue with Roe’s other prediction that World War II devastation leads to pro-labor 
laws.  This also is not true in a broader sample, as illustrated in Figure VI.   The data are 
inconsistent with the theory that World War II destruction explains LLSV evidence.  
 
Explaining Divergence 
  57  Although we do not see any evidence for the reversal of rankings between 
common and civil law countries in financial development over the course of the 20
th 
century, the historical research yields two important findings that require an explanation.  
First, as shown by Rajan and Zingales (2003) and in Figure III, common law countries 
appear to have moved sharply ahead of civil law ones in financial development over the 
course of the 20
th century.  Second, investor protection improved sharply in the common 
law countries over the same time period (Coffee 1999, Cheffins 2001, Franks et al. 2005).  
We suggest that Legal Origins Theory naturally accounts for these findings.       
 The  20
th century represented a period of explosive growth of the world economy, 
including of countries that were the wealthiest at the beginning of that century.   That 
growth relied to a significant extent on outside capital.   That growth was also far from 
smooth: it was punctuated by World Wars, the Great Depression, and significant 
economic and financial crises.  The countries that grew successfully found their own 
ways to deliver capital to firms and to survive the crises.  For some countries, such 
success involved massive state involvement in finance and development.  For other 
countries, such success to a much greater extent relied on shoring up markets.   
  Here is where legal origins come in.  As Morck and Steier (2005) make clear, 
civil law countries in the middle of the century relied heavily on state supply of finance, 
bank nationalization, and state investment companies to promote economic growth and 
resolve crises.  These were the standard civil law solutions to addressing social problems, 
going back at least to Napoleon.  Common law countries, particularly the US and the UK, 
in contrast, relied more heavily on market-supporting regulations, such as securities laws, 
deposit insurance, and court-led improvements in the corporate law.  These differences 
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supporting reforms in civil law ones, but they were pronounced nonetheless.  We saw 
this, for example, in the La Porta et al. (2002) data on government ownership of banks.   
In these very different ways, both some of the civil law countries and some of the 
common law ones successfully solved their problems.  In the second half of the century, 
however, the world became a good deal more peaceful and orderly.  In such a world, the 
market-supporting solutions of the common law system, whether in the form of judicial 
decisions or regulations, worked better than the policy-implementing solutions of the 
civil law system.  As a consequence of their 20
th century legal and regulatory evolution, 
common law countries ended up with sharply better investor protections.  Their financial 
markets ran away from the civil law ones, as we see in the data.  Looking back over the 
course of the 20
th century, we see the basic differences in the legal traditions and 
regulatory strategies playing out in how both the laws and the markets evolve.   
 
VIII. A Blueprint for Policy Reform. 
  Legal Origins Theory points to three important ways in which prevailing legal and 
regulatory rules might be inefficient.  First, to the extent that a country has a particular 
legal or regulatory style shaped by its legal tradition, it might apply the tools 
characteristic of that style to areas of regulation where they are inappropriate.   A good 
example of this that we already mentioned is the reliance on frequent interlocutory 
appeals in civil law bankruptcy procedures.  Such appeals are central to the civil 
procedure of civil law countries, yet result in massive destruction of value in bankruptcy 
(Djankov et al. 2006, Gamboa and Schneider 2007).   Second, a country that introduces 
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when the situation returns to normal.   Heavy government ownership of banks, which 
might have a purpose at the time of extreme financial underdevelopment, becomes a 
burden under normal circumstances (La Porta et al. 2002).  Third, transplantation of legal 
and regulatory rules might itself become an important source of inefficiency, as rules 
suitable for developed economies become a source of massive delay and corruption in the 
developing countries that copy them (Pistor et al. 2003a,b, Spamann 2006). 
  The inefficiency of the prevailing legal and regulatory rules points to a blueprint 
for reforms.  Such reforms would focus on the design of what Djankov et al. (2003c) 
called “appropriate institutions,” those that seek to achieve the optimal tradeoff between 
dictatorship and disorder in ways compatible with each country’s level of economic 
development and legal tradition.   In some instances, the direction of such reforms is 
simply less government intervention.  Neither underdevelopment nor the legal tradition 
justifies heavy regulation of entry, so the reduction in those barriers is uncontroversial 
from the efficiency perspective.  Likewise, aspects of the formalism of bankruptcy 
procedures, which probably are the heritage of civil law, appear detrimental to efficiency 
at all levels of economic development, and could be reduced without impinging the 
foundations of legal order.  In other instances, the best solutions might differ across legal 
systems.  For example, while common law countries depend on investor protection to 
support their debt markets, many civil law countries have successfully relied on 
information sharing institutions, such as credit bureaus, for the same purpose (Djankov et 
al. 2007).  Finally, in situations of extreme disorder, such as participation or recovery 
from war, even more aggressive government interventions might be appropriate.       
  60  The crucial requirement of reform is the availability of objective data on legal and 
regulatory rules, preferably in a comparative form so that the consequences of particular 
rules can be evaluated.  Perhaps the most useful contribution of our research has been to 
establish the possibility of collecting such data in a broad range of areas.  More recently, 
the data collection project has made substantial strides through a World Bank Doing 
Business initiative, which assembles and updates much of the information on laws and 
regulations discussed in this paper, as well as some additional indicators.  Even the 
publication of this report has proved controversial, with the French government accusing 
its authors of an Anglo-Saxon bias.  Nonetheless, the report has proved popular, and has 
encouraged regulatory reforms in dozens of countries. 
The pace of legal and regulatory reform stimulated by the evidence is quickening.  
Perhaps the greatest progress has been made in the reductions of entry regulations.  
According to the 2006 Doing Business report, in 2005 and 2006 fifty five countries 
undertook reforms that lowered administrative costs of starting a business and obtaining a 
license.  In Russia, an aggressive reformer in this area, the effects on encouraging the 
entry of new firms have been significant (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2007).   
The picture is more mixed for labor markets.  OECD (2006) reports that labor 
markets were liberalized in OECD countries in the last 15 years, although most reforms 
pertained to temporary rather than permanent employment.   In contrast, Heckman and 
Pages (2004) see no tendency for liberalization in Latin America during the 1990s.   
With respect to investor protection, Pagano and Volpin (2005) report gains in 
shareholder rights in OECD countries during the 1990s.  Enriques and Volpin (2007) 
describe a tendency toward improving shareholder rights in the EU.  At the same time, 
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transactions, which is the most common form of self-dealing in Europe.”  We are aware 
of no systematic evidence for emerging markets, although there are examples of 
improvement, such as the Mexican bankruptcy reform (Gamboa and Schneider 2007).   
  The use of our indicators of laws and regulations, with their clear correlations 
with legal origins, for policy analysis has stimulated two objections.  Some accuse us of 
claiming that legal origin is destiny, so any reform of investor protection or of other 
regulations short of wholesale replacement of the legal system is futile.  This is not what 
Legal Origin Theory says.  The theory indeed holds that some aspects of the legal 
tradition are so hard-wired that changing them would be extremely costly, and that 
reforms must be sensitive to legal traditions.  Nonetheless, many legal and regulatory 
rules, such as entry regulations, disclosure requirements, or some procedural rules in 
litigation, can be reformed without disturbing the fundamentals of the legal tradition.    
Some critics also argue that the legal rules we measure are not the right ones.  
Even if these rules capture the broad stance of the law toward investor or worker 
protection, the most relevant legal rules, doctrines, or even patterns of judicial behavior 
responsible for the observed outcomes might be different from what we measure.  
Focusing the reforms formalistically on our sub-indices will then be futile.  For example, 
if judges are reluctant to take on corporate self-dealing cases, and find technical or 
procedural excuses to throw them out, changing the rules of approval of self-dealing 
transactions might be futile.  As Berkowitz et al. (2003) and Mauro et al. (2006) find, 
reforms are more likely to succeed when people they affect choose to accept them.   
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any country must be sensitive to the actual legal or regulatory bottlenecks.  
Understanding what actually happens on the ground is essential.  So if judges throw out 
self-dealing cases, one might want to find out why they do so, and focus on how to get 
them to stop.  If labor courts rule for employees regardless of what the law says, labor 
market reformers should take note.   Having said this, in many circumstances the actual 
laws on the books that we measure are indeed the reason for inefficient outcomes.  The 
heavy regulations of entry are one such example, procedural formalism is another.  And 
even when the legal rules we measure are not the entire problem, and thoughtless 
formalistic reforms are likely to fail, the rules can point the reformer closer to where the 
problem actually lies.  In either case, the measured rules provide highly relevant data. 
Although the evidence on reforms is just beginning to come in, and much of it is 
unfortunately confined to the developed world, many countries seem to be moving 
toward market-friendlier government interventions.  If the world remains peaceful and 
orderly, the attraction of such reforms will only grow. 
   
IX. Conclusion. 
  Since their publication about a decade ago, the two LLSV articles have taken 
some bumps.  We now use different measures of shareholder protection, and are skeptical 
about the use of instrumental variables.  Our interpretation of the meaning of legal origins 
has evolved considerably over time.  But the bumps notwithstanding, the basic 
contribution appears to us to still be standing, perhaps even taller than a decade ago.   
And that is the idea that legal origins – broadly interpreted as highly persistent systems of 
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regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes.   The range of 
empirically documented legal, economic, and social spheres where legal origins have 
consequences has expanded over the past decade. 
    At the end of our overview, we believe that four propositions are correct, at least 
given the current state of our knowledge.  First, legal rules and regulations differ 
systematically across countries, and these differences can be measured and quantified.  
Second, these differences in legal rules and regulations are accounted for to a significant 
extent by legal origins.  Third, the basic historical divergence in the styles of legal 
traditions – the policy-implementing focus of civil law versus the market-supporting 
focus of common law – explains well why legal rules differ.  Fourth, the measured 
differences in legal rules matter for economic and social outcomes.      
  The fact that the outlines of a coherent theory have emerged over the last decade 
does not mean that all, or most, of the empirical issues have been settled, or, for that 
matter, that the theory will survive further scrutiny.  From our perspective, the crucial 
open questions deal with the evolution of legal systems:  How do they deal with crises?  
How do they enter new spheres of regulation?  How do they approach reforms?   We 
have offered many illustrations from the historical record, but a comprehensive account 
of legal and regulatory evolution under common and civil law does not exist.   
   Such an account might clarify an issue that has generated tremendous heat, and 
not much light, throughout this research, namely the circumstances under which each 
legal tradition “works better.”  Legal Origins Theory does not point to the overall 
superiority of common law; to the contrary, it points to the superiority of civil law and 
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the other hand, our attempt to find evidence for the commonly made defense of civil law 
that it provides greater fairness or better access to justice have failed; the data suggest the 
opposite (Djankov et al. 2003b).   
  A deeper understanding of the dynamics of legal traditions may also inform the 
crucial question of whether the differences between common and civil law will persist 
into the future.  Since we have shown legal origins to be closely related to the types of 
capitalism, this question can be rephrased as follows: what kind of capitalism is likely to 
prevail in the long run?  Will it be the more market-focused Anglo-Saxon capitalism, or 
the more state-centered capitalism of Continental Europe and perhaps Asia?   
There are many arguments for convergence.  Globalization leads to a much faster 
exchange of ideas, including ideas about laws and regulations, and therefore encourages 
the transfer of legal knowledge.  Globalization also encourages competition among 
countries for foreign direct investment, for capital, and for business in general, which 
must as well put some pressure toward the adoption of good legal rules and regulations.   
The convergence is working both by civil law countries increasingly accepting 
common law solutions, and vice versa.   In one area where heavy regulation appears 
patently absurd – the entry of new firms – countries are rapidly tearing down the barriers.  
In Europe at least, there are some reductions in labor regulations, as well as gains in 
shareholder rights.  At the same time, common law countries are increasingly resorting to 
legislation to address social problems, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act being the most recent 
example of such financial regulation in the U.S.    Mediating against convergence is the 
fact that civil law countries continue to resort to “policy-implementing” solutions to 
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such as the 35 hour workweek in France, is huge.     
All this, of course, leaves open the question of what legal rules and regulations the 
countries are likely to move toward, even if they do not converge.  So, in conclusion, let 
us again rely on theory to make a prediction.  The world economy in the last quarter 
century has been surprisingly calm, and has moved sharply toward capitalism and 
markets.  In that environment, our framework suggests, the common law approach to 
social control of economic life performs better than the civil law approach.  When 
markets do or can work well, it is better to support than to replace them.  As long as the 
world economy remains free of war, major financial crises, or order extraordinary 
disturbances, the competitive pressures for market-supporting regulation will remain 
strong, and we are likely to see continued liberalization.   Of course, underlying this 
prediction is a hopeful assumption that nothing like World War II or the Great 
Depression will repeat itself.  If it does, countries are likely to embrace civil law 
solutions, just as they did back then.   
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b -0.6091 -0.8950
[0.4804] [0.5768] [0.5625] [0.5382] [0.6865] [0.5724] [0.5316] [0.5773] [0.4938] [0.5908] [0.6500]
Log(GDP per capita in 2002) 0.2415
a 0.2573 0.3920c 0.277 0.248 -0.0823 -0.0991 -0.0835 -0.1771 -0.0685 -0.0780
[0.0893] [0.2349] [0.1956] [0.1856] [0.1887] [0.1249] [0.1214] [0.1225] [0.1409] [0.1246] [0.1190]
Constant 0.2311
a 0.0177 -0.7691 0.3359 1.2775 3.3971
a 2.6663
b 3.6212
a 5.0362
a 2.9833
c 2.9900
a
[0.0882] [2.4440] [1.6375] [1.5286] [1.7662] [1.2091] [1.1083] [1.2349] [1.6400] [1.5731] [1.0425]
Observations 131 52 52 52 52 73 73 71 73 72 73
R-squared 21% 15% 16% 17% 20% 14% 19% 14% 17% 13% 15%
a Significant at the 1% level.
b Significant at the 5% level.
c Significant at the 10% level.
Table IV:  Creditor rights, Culture, and Legal Origin
Dependent Variable:  Creditor's rights in 2002(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13)
Anti-Self-Dealing
Disclosure in 
Prospectus
Creditor Rights Debt Enforcement 
Govt Ownership 
Banks
Ln(Steps) Labor laws Media ownership Draft
Judicial 
Formalism
Tenure Judges Case Law
French Legal Origin -0.3081
a -0.2396
a -0.8224
a -15.0560
a 0.2821
a 0.6588
a 0.2500a 0.2589
a 0.5324
a 1.4287
a -0.1812
a -0.6951
a
[0.0508] [0.0567] [0.2496] [4.7212] [0.0887] [0.1007] [0.0401] [0.0828] [0.0877] [0.1830] [0.0597] [0.0997]
German Legal Origin -0.3651
a -0.1817
b -0.172 -12.8704
b 0.2876
b 0.4641
a 0.2278
a 0.1731
c 0.7956
a 0.8703
a -0.3070
b -0.1534
[0.0610] [0.0734] [0.2874] [5.0798] [0.1168] [0.1397] [0.0564] [0.0883] [0.0977] [0.2225] [0.1215] [0.2094]
Scandinavian Legal Origin -0.3569
a -0.1247
b -0.9121
c 4.9701 0.2038 -0.2948c 0.3786
a 0.3036
a 0.6663
a 0.4976 0.0041 -0.0195
[0.0686] [0.0578] [0.5194] [5.4404] [0.1744] [0.1535] [0.0555] [0.0791] [0.2185] [0.3415] [0.0534] [0.1147]
Proportion Voting -0.0113 -0.0808
a 0.0285 -2.9350
c 0.0498 0.0567 0.0049 -0.0970
a 0.0144 0.1591
b -0.0100 0.0577
[0.0197] [0.0212] [0.0924] [1.4869] [0.0307] [0.0354] [0.0168] [0.0289] [0.0318] [0.0732] [0.0227] [0.0466]
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.0794
a 0.0662
b 0.1720
c 21.8143
a -0.1866
a -0.2134
a -0.0067 -0.1406
a -0.0303 -0.2953
a 0.0121 -0.0420
[0.0259] [0.0283] [0.0979] [2.7143] [0.0423] [0.0392] [0.0176] [0.0316] [0.0347] [0.0686] [0.0230] [0.0354]
Constant -0.0418 0.2453 0.7988 -135.4145
a 1.6261
a 3.5430
a 0.3580
b 1.4214a 0.4013 5.1870
a 0.9051
a 1.2672
a
[0.2349] [0.2771] [0.8054] [27.1079] [0.3200] [0.3158] [0.1597] [0.3014] [0.2901] [0.5966] [0.1897] [0.2854]
Observations 68 48 116 77 70 80 79 87 132 93 60 60
R-squared 0.47 0.59 0.16 0.66 0.38 0.63 0.4 0.45 0.33 0.52 0.19 0.45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13)
Anti-Self-Dealing
Disclosure in 
Prospectus
Creditor Rights Debt Enforcement 
Govt Ownership 
Banks
Ln(Steps) Labor laws Media ownership Draft
Judicial 
Formalism
Tenure Judges Case Law
French Legal Origin -0.3356
a -0.3318
a -0.9337a -18.2437
a 0.3432a 0.7018a 0.2606a 0.0699 0.6459a 1.6322
a -0.2234a -0.6417a
[0.0478] [0.0581] [0.2932] [5.7738] [0.0737] [0.0907] [0.0357] [0.0737] [0.1041] [0.2033] [0.0705] [0.1148]
German Legal Origin -0.3255
a -0.2395
b -0.2227 -12.9735
b 0.3417
a 0.5590
a 0.2058
a 0.0357 1.6322
a 1.0687
a 1.6322
a -0.2718
[0.0753] [0.0967] [0.3249] [5.4856] [0.0870] [0.1226] [0.0496] [0.0877] [0.1165] [0.2227] [0.1461] [0.2264]
Scandinavian Legal Origin -0.2935
a -0.2763
a -0.7540 0.7023 0.0062 -0.1003 0.3365
a 0.0189 1.6322
a 0.5668
b 0.0694 0.1708
[0.0605] [0.0659] [0.5658] [5.5078] [0.1179] [0.1552] [0.0529] [0.0680] [0.1358] [0.2564] [0.0501] [0.1127]
Left Power -0.1518
b -0.0248 -0.3157 -2.7732 0.3668
a -0.1782 0.1212
b 0.0787 1.6322
a 0.1608 1.6322
a -0.2380
[0.0727] [0.0966] [0.3662] [7.9727] [0.1127] [0.1302] [0.0598] [0.1091] [0.1454] [0.2493] [0.1259] [0.2236]
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.0665
b 0.0596b 0.0752 20.7717
a -0.1333a -0.2244
a 0.0104 -0.1058
a -0.0058 -0.2133
b 0.0051 -0.0397
[0.0274] [0.0284] [0.1302] [3.0620] [0.0336] [0.0417] [0.0173] [0.0330] [0.0425] [0.0813] [0.0275] [0.0537]
Constant 0.1488 0.2419 1.9708 -127.0101
a 1.1137
a 3.7683
a 0.1487 1.6322
a 0.0687 1.6322
a 1.6322
a 1.6322
a
[0.2701] [0.2802] [1.2386] [31.9668] [0.2521] [0.3815] [0.1674] [0.3470] [0.3970] [0.7284] [0.2402] [0.5728]
Observations 68 49 85 65 60 86 85 71 83 79 54 54
R-squared 0.5 0.45 0.17 0.64 0.49 0.62 0.45 0.23 0.49 0.51 0.35 0.4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13)
Anti-Self-Dealing
Disclosure in 
Prospectus
Creditor Rights Debt Enforcement 
Govt Ownership 
Banks
Ln(Steps) Labor laws Media ownership Draft
Judicial 
Formalism
Tenure Judges Case Law
French Legal Origin -0.3652
a -0.3417
a -1.1527
a -14.1876
b 0.3340
a 0.6856
a 0.2306
a 0.0527 0.6006
a 1.5479
a -0.1952
a -0.5835
a
[0.0491] [0.0558] [0.3483] [5.8526] [0.0851] [0.1018] [0.0395] [0.0751] [0.1226] [0.2280] [0.0644] [0.1220]
German Legal Origin -0.3465
a -0.2336
a -0.4663 -9.8379
c 0.3237
a 0.5845
a 0.1891
a 0.0795 0.7490
a 1.1105
a -0.4707
a -0.2458
[0.0720] [0.0836] [0.3824] [5.3885] [0.1069] [0.1160] [0.0473] [0.0975] [0.1311] [0.2358] [0.1511] [0.2198]
Scandinavian Legal Origin -0.2261
a -0.1017 -1.1557 6.7209 0.0200 -0.2346 0.3363
a 0.0438 0.8458
a 0.9283
b 0.0865 0.4935
b
[0.0813] [0.1063] [0.7030] [7.2616] [0.1813] [0.1845] [0.0633] [0.0945] [0.1745] [0.3883] [0.1882] [0.2430]
Union Density -0.2786
b -0.3567
c 0.3122 -13.8014 0.2637 0.1718 0.0751 0.0371 0.0579 -0.4384 -0.3235 -0.7425
c
[0.1100] [0.1789] [0.7056] [9.9588] [0.2666] [0.2108] [0.0888] [0.1274] [0.1993] [0.5227] [0.3683] [0.3918]
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.0926
a 0.0810
a 0.0877 25.2792
a -0.1830
a -0.2432
a -0.0107 -0.1139
a -0.0623 -0.3230
a 0.0912
c 0.0175
[0.0272] [0.0264] [0.1528] [3.3672] [0.0420] [0.0356] [0.0208] [0.0405] [0.0547] [0.0886] [0.0527] [0.0459]
Constant -0.0729 0.1247 1.7383 -170.3391
a 1.5766
a 3.8136
a 0.3932
b 1.0863
b 0.7448 5.6368
a 0.2690 0.9510
b
[0.2576] [0.2366] [1.3894] [33.9071] [0.3010] [0.2857] [0.1956] [0.4153] [0.4974] [0.7204] [0.4138] [0.4098]
Observations 64 49 70 58 58 71 70 61 68 69 51 51
R-squared 0.56 0.5 0.19 0.69 0.41 0.66 0.4 0.19 0.41 0.51 0.33 0.41
a Significant at the 1% level.
b Significant at the 5% level.
c Significant at the 10% level.
Panel C:  Legal origin and union density
Panel A:  Legal origin and proportional voting
Panel B:  Legal origin and power of the left
Table V:  Legal Origin and Politics(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13)
Anti-Self-
Dealing
Disclosure in 
Prospectus
Creditor Rights
Debt 
Enforcement 
Govt Ownership 
Banks
Ln(Steps) Labor laws
Media 
ownership
Draft
Judicial 
Formalism
Tenure Judges Case Law
French Legal Origin -0.3421
a -0.3642
a -1.1816
a -14.3174
b 0.2822
b 0.4438
a 0.2040
a 0.3632
a 0.5135
a 1.5754
a -0.2245
a -0.5494
a
[0.0792] [0.0858] [0.2685] [6.6720] [0.1172] [0.0925] [0.0464] [0.1157] [0.1041] [0.2511] [0.0781] [0.1481]
German Legal Origin -0.2508 -0.1145c -0.7960b -3.4763 0.3852b 0.0936 0.1333b 0.2438 0.8059a 0.6624c -0.7610a -0.4503
[0.1487] [0.0639] [0.3729] [7.9660] [0.1514] [0.1618] [0.0559] [0.1711] [0.1045] [0.3676] [0.1834] [0.3774]
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.1074
b 0.0907
b 0.2571
b 21.8679
a -0.1259
c -0.1023
b 0.0011 -0.2153
a 0.0185 -0.1181 0.0116 0.0288
[0.0445] [0.0401] [0.0989] [4.3514] [0.0657] [0.0392] [0.0257] [0.0435] [0.0522] [0.1121] [0.0371] [0.0695]
Constant -0.2647 -0.0156 0.3189 -141.9287
a 1.2749
a 2.8843
a 0.3142 1.8839
a 0.0311 3.9626
a 0.9107
a 0.7015
[0.3658] [0.3398] [0.8444] [39.5086] [0.4261] [0.3254] [0.2157] [0.3860] [0.3999] [0.8497] [0.2851] [0.5060]
Observations 37 26 78 39 47 47 46 52 84 51 38 38
R-squared 0.36 0.46 0.22 0.51 0.18 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.27 0.46 0.3 0.26
a Significant at the 1% level.
b Significant at the 5% level.
c Significant at the 10% level.
Table VI:  Legal origin in countries with autocratic governmentsCountry Legal Origin 1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999
Australia English 0.39 0.5 0.91 0.75 0.94 0.76 0.38 0.37 1.13
Canada English 0.74 1.00 0.57 1.59 1.75 0.46 1.22 1.22
India English 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.46
South Africa English 0.68 0.91 1.97 1.23 1.33 1.20
United Kingdom English 1.09 1.38 1.14 0.77 1.06 1.63 0.38 0.81 2.25
United States English 0.39 0.75 0.56 0.33 0.61 0.66 0.46 0.54 1.52
Avg Common Law 0.53 0.68 0.74 0.53 0.86 1.14 0.49 0.74 1.30
Argentina French 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.15
Belgium French 0.99 1.31 0.32 0.23 0.09 0.31 0.82
Brazil French 0.25 0.05 0.08 0.45
Chile French 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.34 0.50 1.05
Cuba French 2.19
Egypt, Arab Rep. French 1.09 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.29
France French 0.78 0.19 0.08 0.28 0.16 0.09 0.24 1.17
Italy French 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.07 0.42 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.68
Netherlands French 0.56 0.74 0.25 0.67 0.42 0.19 0.50 2.03
Russian Federation French 0.18 0.11
Spain French 0.17 0.41 0.69
Avg French Law 0.66 0.77 0.40 0.13 0.29 0.16 0.12 0.28 0.74
Austria German 0.76 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.17
Germany German 0.44 0.35 0.18 0.15 0.35 0.16 0.09 0.2 0.67
Japan German 0.49 1.20 1.81 0.05 0.36 0.23 0.33 1.64 0.95
Switzerland German 0.58 0.50 0.44 1.93 3.23
Avg German Law 0.57 0.78 1.00 0.10 0.36 0.25 0.22 0.99 1.26
Denmark Scandinavian 0.36 0.17 0.25 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.67 0.67
Norway Scandinavian 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.54 0.23 0.7
Sweden Scandinavian 0.47 0.41 0.3 0.18 0.24 0.14 0.11 0.39 1.77
Avg Scandinavian Law 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.16 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.43 1.05
Table VII:  Stock Market Capitalization over GDP (Rajan and Zingales)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Year Belgium France Italy Mexico Japan Germany Switzerland Denmark Norway Sweden Australia Canada Great Britain India Israel South Africa USA
1805 7
1815
1830 14
1850 69 12 6 23
1860 1
1861 11
1875 64 17 2
1880 38 80 63 14 54
1881 7
1885 4
1895 58 11 26 156 3
1899 26
1900 32 82 74 71
1912 95
1913 88 65 41 37 123 88 40 121 5 130
1914 6
1927 154
1929 69 23 3 29 137 126 9 85 193
1930 25 75 46
1937 182
1938 2 17 149 66 139
1939 33 28 14 105
1940 47 118
1947 61
1948 32 44 107 39 110
1950 25 13 12 58
1951 19 5.67
1953 11
1955 24 59 113
1956 47
1957 51
1960 111 37 31 137 37 14
1962 5.59
1963 57 43
1965 24 30 46 116 33 9 48 46 83 6.30 108 124
1966
1969 33
1970 29 15
1972 63 27 7
1973 20 28 25 92 30 26 44 36 65 85 83
1975 12
1976 17 39 0.5
1977 10 39 24 21 76
1978 53 102 27 5 21 41 37 57
Table VIII:  Stock market capitalization over GDP (Goldsmith 1985)
French Legal Origin German Legal Origin Scandinavian Legal Origin English Legal Origin